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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1. Modeling opinion exchange
The exchange of opinions between individuals is a fundamental so-
cial interaction that plays a role in nearly any social, political and
economic process. While it is unlikely that a simple mathematical
model can accurately describe the exchange of opinions between two
persons, one could hope to gain some insights on emergent phenomena
that affect large groups of people.
Moreover, many models in this field are an excellent playground
for mathematicians, especially those working in probability, algorithms
and combinatorics. One of the goals of this survey is to introduce
such models to mathematicians, and especially to those working in
discrete mathematics, information theory, optimization and probability
and statistics.
1.1.1. Modeling approaches. Many of the models we discuss in
the survey comes from the literature in theoretical economics. In mi-
croeconomic theory, the main paradigm of modeling human interaction
is by a game, in which participants are rational agents, choosing their
moves optimally and responding to the strategies of their peers. A
particularly interesting class of games is that of probabilistic Bayesian
games, in which players also take into account the uncertainty and
randomness of the world.
Another class of models, which have a more explicit combinatorial
description, are what we refer to as hueristic models. These consider
the dynamics that emerge when agents are assumed to utilize some
(usually simple) update rule or algorithm when interacting with each
other. Economists often justify such models as describing agents with
bounded rationality.
It is interesting that both of these approaches are often justified
by an Occam’s razor argument. To justify the heuristic models, the
argument is that assuming that people use a simple heuristic satisfies
Occam’s razor. Indeed, it is undeniable that the simpler the heuristic,
the weaker the assumption. On the other hand, the Bayesian argument
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is that even by choosing a simple heuristic one has too much freedom
to reverse engineer any desired result. Bayesians therefore opt to only
assume that agents are rational. This, however, may result in extremely
complicated behavior.
There exists several other natural dichotomies and sub-dichotomies.
In rational models, one can assume that agents tell each other their
opinions. A more common assumption in Economics is that agents
learn by observing each other’s actions; these are choices that an in-
dividual makes that not only reflect its belief, but also carry potential
gain or penalty. For example, in financial markets one could assume
that traders tell each other their value estimates, but a perhaps more
natural setting is that they learn about these values by seeing which
actual bids their peers place, since the latter are costly to manipulate.
Hence the adage “actions speak louder than words.”
Some actions can be more revealing than others. A bid by a trader
could reveal the value the trader believes the asset carries, but in a
different setting it could perhaps just reveal whether the trader thinks
that the asset is currently overpriced or underpriced. In other models
an action could perhaps reveal all that an agent knows. We shall see
that widely disparate outcomes can result in models that differ only by
how revealing the actions are.
Although the distinction between opinions, beliefs and actions is
sometimes blurry, we shall follow the convention of having agents learn
from each other’s actions. While in some models this will only be a
matter of nomenclature, in others this will prove to be a pivotal choice.
The term belief will be reserved for a technical definition (see below),
and we shall not use opinion, except informally.
1.2. Mathematical Connections
Many of the models of information exchange on networks are inti-
mately related to nice mathematical concepts, often coming from prob-
ability, discrete mathematics, optimization and information theory. We
will see how the theories of Markov chains, martingales arguments, in-
fluences and graph limits all play a crucial role in analyzing the models
we describe in these notes. Some of the arguments and models we
present may fit well as classroom materials or exercises in a graduate
course in probability.
1.3. Related Literature
It is impossible to cover the huge body of work related to infor-
mation exchange in networks. We will cite some relevant papers at
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each section. However, some general comments apply to the economics
literature:
• It is well accepted that many of the papers in the area have se-
rious mathematical mistakes either in statements or in proofs.
From our experience it is better to check all details in papers
carefully to see what they prove and if the proofs are correct.
• Since the focus in economics is often more about the justifica-
tion of the model and the interpretation of the results, many
papers discuss very small variants of the same model using
essentially the same proofs.
• For mathematicians who are used to models coming from nat-
ural sciences, the models in the economics literature will often
look as very rough approximation and the conclusions drawn
in terms of real life networks unjustified. Our view is that
the models have very limited implication towards real life and
can serve as most as allegories. We refer the readers who are
interested in this point to Rubinstein’s book ”Economic Fa-
bles” [36].
1.4. Framework
The majority of models we consider share the a common underlying
framework, which describes a set of agents, a state of the world, and
the information the agents have regarding this state. We describe it
formally in Section 1.5 bellow, and shall note explicitly whenever we
depart from it.
We will take a probabilistic / statistical point of view in studying
models. In particular we will assume that the model includes a ran-
dom variable S which is the true state of the world. It is this S that all
agents want to learn. For some of the models, and in particular the ra-
tional, economic models, this is a natural and even necessary modeling
choice. For some other models - the voter model, for example (Sec-
tion 2.2), this is a somewhat artificial choice. However, it helps us take
a single perspective by asking, for each model, how well it performs as
a statistical procedure aimed at estimating S. Somewhat surprisingly,
we will reach similarly flavored conclusions in widely differing settings.
In particular, a repeated phenomenon that we observe is that egalitar-
ianism, or decentralization facilitates the flow of information in social
networks, in both game-theoretical and heuristic models.
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1.5. General definitions
1.5.1. Agents, state of the world and private signals. Let V
be a countable set of agents, which we take to be {1, 2, . . . , n} in the
finite case and N = {1, 2, . . .} in the infinite case. Let {0, 1} be the set
of possible values of the state of the world S.
Let Ω be a compact metric space equipped with the Borel sigma-
algebra. For example, and without much loss of generality, Ω could be
taken to equal the closed interval [0, 1]. Let Wi ∈ Ω be agent i’s private
signal, and denote W¯ = (W1,W2, . . .).
Fix µ0 and µ1, two mutually absolutely continuous measures on Ω.
We assume that S is distributed uniformly, and that conditioned on S,
the Wi’s are i.i.d. µS: when S = 0 then W¯ ∼ µV0 , and when S = 1 then
W¯ ∼ µV1 .
More formally, let δ0 and δ1 be the distributions on {0, 1} such that
δ0(0) = δ1(1) = 1. We consider the probability space {0, 1}×ΩV , with
the measure P defined by
P = Pµ0,µ1,V = 12δ0 × µV0 + 12δ1 × µV1 ,
and let
(S, W¯ ) ∼ P.
1.5.2. The social network. A social network G = (V,E) is a
directed graph, with V the set of agents. The set of neighbors of i ∈ V
is ∂i = {j : (i, j) ∈ E} ∪ {i} (i.e., ∂i includes i). The out-degree of i
is given by |∂i|. The degree of G is give by supi∈V |∂i|.
We make the following assumption on G.
Assumption 1.5.1. We assume throughout that G is simple and
strongly connected, and that each out-degree is finite.
We recall that a graph is strongly connect if for every two nodes i, j
there exists a directed path from i to j. Finite out-degrees mean that
an agent observes the actions of a finite number of other agents. We do
allow infinite in-degrees; this corresponds to agents whose actions are
observed by infinitely many other agents. In the different models that
we consider we impose various other constraints on the social network.
1.5.3. Time periods and actions. We consider the discrete time
periods t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., where in each period each agent i ∈ V has to
choose an action Ait ∈ {0, 1}. This action is a function of agent i’s
private signal, as well as the actions of its neighbors in previous time
periods, and so can be thought of as a function from Ω× {0, 1}|∂i|·t to
{0, 1}. The exact functional dependence varies among the models.
1.6. QUESTIONS 5
1.5.4. Extensions, generalizations, variations and special
cases. The framework presented above admits some natural exten-
sions, generalizations and variations. Conversely, some special cases
deserve particular attention. Indeed, some of the results we describe
apply more generally, while others do not apply more generally, or ap-
ply only to special cases. We discuss these matters when describing
each model.
• The state of the world can take values from sets larger
than {0, 1}, including larger finite sets, countably infinite sets
or continuums.
• The agents’ private signals may not be i.i.d. conditioned
on S: they may be independent but not identical, they may
be identical but not independent (for example, we consider a
case when they are merely, pairwise independent), or they may
have a general joint distribution.
An interesting special case is when the space of private
signals is equal to the space of the states of the world. In this
case one can think of the private signals as each agent’s initial
guess of S.
• A number of models consider only undirected social net-
works, that is, symmetric social networks in which (i, j) ∈
E ⇔ (j, i) ∈ E.
• More general network model include weighted directed models
where different directed edges have different weights.
• Time can be continuous. In this case we assume that each
agent is equipped with an i.i.d. Poisson clock according to
which it “wakes up” and acts. In the finite case this is equiv-
alent to having a single, uniformly chosen random agent act
in each discrete time period. It is also possible to define more
general continuous time processes.
• Actions can take more values than {0, 1}. In particular we
shall consider the case that actions take values in [0, 1].
In order to model randomized behavior of the agents, we
shall also consider actions that are not measurable in the pri-
vate signal, but depend also on some additional randomness.
This will require the appropriate extension of the measure P
to a larger probability space.
1.6. Questions
The main phenomena that we shall study are convergence, agree-
ment, unanimity, learning and more.
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• Convergence. We say that agent i converges when limtAit ex-
ists. We say that the entire process converges when all agents
converge.
The question of convergence will arise in all the models we
study, and its answer in the positive will often be a requirement
for subsequent treatment. When we do have convergence we
define
Ai∞ = lim
t→∞
Ait.
• Agreement and unanimity. We say that agents i and j
agree when limtA
i
t = limtA
j
t . Unanimity is the event that i
and j agree for all pairs of agents i and j. In this case we can
define
A∞ = Ai∞,
where the choice of i on the r.h.s. is immaterial.
• Learning. We say that agent i learns S when Ai∞ = S, and
that learning occurs in a model when all agents learn. In
cases where we allow actions in [0, 1], we will say that i learns
whenever round (Ai∞) = S, where round (·) denotes rounding
to the nearest integer, with round (() 1/2) = 1/2.
We will also explore the notion of asymptotic learning. This
is said to occur for a sequence of graph {Gn}∞n=1 if the agents
on Gn learn with probability approaching one as n tends to
infinity.
A recurring theme will be the relation between these questions and
the geometry or topology of the social network. We shall see that indeed
different networks may exhibit different behaviors in these regards, and
that in particular, and across very different settings, decentralized or
egalitarian networks tend to promote learning.
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CHAPTER 2
Heuristic Models
2.1. The DeGroot model
The first model we describe was pioneered by Morris DeGroot in
1974 [13]. DeGroot’s contribution was to take standard results in the
theory of Markov Processes (See, e.g., Doob [15]) and apply them in
the social setting. The basic idea for these models is that people re-
peatedly average their neighbors’ actions. This model has been studied
extensively in the economics literature.
2.1.1. Definition. Following our general framework (Section 1.5),
we shall consider a state of the world S ∈ {0, 1} with conditionally i.i.d.
private signals. The distribution of private signals is what we shall
henceforth refer to as Bernoulli private signals: for some 1
2
> δ > 0,
µi(S) =
1
2
+ δ and µi(1 − S) = 12 − δ, for i = 0, 1. Obviously this is
equivalent to setting P [Wi = S] = 12 + δ.
In the DeGroot model, we let the actions take values in [0, 1]. In
particular, we define the actions as follows:
Ai0 = Wi
and for t > 0
Ait =
∑
j∈∂i
w(i, j)Ajt−1,(1)
where we make the following three assumptions:
(1)
∑
j∈∂iw(i, j) = 1 for all i ∈ V .
(2) i ∈ ∂i for all i ∈ V .
(3) w(i, j) > 0 for all (i, j) ∈ E.
The last two assumptions are non-standard, and, in fact, not strictly
necessary. We make them to facilitate the presentation of the results
for this model.
We assume that the social network G is finite. We consider both the
general case of a directed strongly connected network, and the special
case of an undirected network.
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2.1.2. Questions and answers. We shall ask, with regards to the
DeGroot model, the same three questions that appear in Section 1.6.
(1) Convergence. Is it the case that agents’ actions converge?
That is, does, for each agent i, the limit limtA
i
t exist almost
surely? We shall show that this is indeed the case.
(2) Agreement. Do all agents eventually reach agreement? That
is, does Ai∞ = A
j
∞ for all (i, j) ∈ V ? Again, we answer this
question in the positive.
(3) Learning. Do all agents learn? In the case of continuous
actions we say that agent i has learned S if round (Ai∞) = S.
Since we have agreement in this model, it follows that either all
agents learn or all do not learn. We will show that the answer
to this question depends on the topology of the social network,
and that, in particular, a certain form of egalitarianism is a
sufficient condition for learning with high probability.
2.1.3. Results. The key to the analysis of the DeGroot model is
the realization that Eq. 1 describes a transformation from the actions
at time t − 1 to the actions at time t that is the Markov operator Pw
of the a random walk on the graph G. However, while usually the
analysis of random walks deals with action of Pw on distributions from
the right, here we act on functions from the left [16]. While this is an
important difference, it is still easy to derive properties of the DeGroot
process from the theory of Markov chains (see, e.g., Doob [15]).
Note first, that assumptions (2) and (3) on Eq. 1 make this Markov
chain irreducible and a-periodic. Since, for a node j
Ajt = E
[
WXjt
]
,
where Xjt is the Markov chain started at j and run for t steps, if follows
that Aj∞ := limtA
j
t is nothing but the expected value of the private
signals, according to the stationary distribution of the chain. We thus
obtain
Theorem 2.1.1 (Convergence and agreement in the DeGroot model).
For each j ∈ V ,
A∞ := lim
t
Ajt =
∑
i∈V
αiWi,
where α = (α1, . . . , αn) is the stationary distirbution of the Markov
chain described by Pw.
Recall that α is the left eigenvector of Pw corresponding to eigen-
value 1, normalized in `1. In the internet age, the vector α is also
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known as the PageRank vector [34]. It is the asymptotic probability of
finding a random walker at a given node after infinitely many steps of
the random walk. Note that α is not random; it is fixed and depends
only the weights w. Note also that Theorem 2.1.1 holds for any real
valued starting actions, and not just ones picked from the distribution
described above. To gain some insight into the result, let us consider
the case of undirected graphs and simple (lazy) random walks. For
these, it can be shown that
αi =
|∂i|∑
j |∂j|
.
Recall that P [Ai0 = S] = 12 + δ. We observe the following.
Proposition 2.1.2 (Learning in the DeGroot model). For a set of
weights w, let pw(δ) = P [round (A∞) = S]. Then:
• pw is a monotone function of δ with pw(0) = 1/2 and pw(1/2) =
1.
• For a fixed 0 < δ < 1/2, among all w’s on graphs of size n,
pw(δ) is maximized when the stationary distribution of G is
uniform.
Proof. • The first part follows by coupling. Note that we
can couple the processes with δ1 and δ2 such that the value
is S is the same and moreover, whenever Wi = S in the δ1
process we also have W1 = S in the δ2 process. Now, since the
vector α is independent of δ and A∞ =
∑
i αiWi, the coupling
above results in |A∞−S| being smaller in the δ2 process than
it is in the δ1 process.
• The second part follows from the Neyman-Peason lemma in
statistics. This lemma states that among all possible estima-
tors, the one that maximizes the probability that S is recon-
structed correctly is given by
Sˆ = round
(
1
n
∑
i
Wi
)

We note that an upper bound on pw(δ) can be obtained using Ho-
effding’s inequality [22]. We leave this as an exercise to the reader.
Finally, the following proposition is again a consequence of well
known results on Markov chains. See the books by Saloff-Coste [37] or
Levin, Peres and Wilmer [25] for basic definitions.
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Proposition 2.1.3 (Rate of Convergence in the Degroot Model).
Suppose that at time t, the total variation distance between the chain
started at i and run for t steps and the stationary distribution is at
most  then a.s.:
max
i
|Ait − A∞| ≤ 2δ.
Proof. Note that
Aii − A∞ = E
[
WXit −WX∞
]
.
Since we can couple the distributions of Xt and X∞ so that they dis-
agree with probability at most  and the maximal difference between
any two private signals is at most δ, the proof follows.

2.1.4. Degroot with cheaters and bribes. A cheater is an
agent who plays a fixed action.
• Exercise. Consider the DeGroot model with a single cheater
who picks some fixed action. What does the process converge
to?
• Exercise. Consider the DeGroot model with k cheaters, each
with some (perhaps different) fixed action. What does the
model converge to?
• Research problem. Consider the following zero sum game.
A and B are two companies. Each company’s strategy is a
choice of k cheaters (cheaters chosen by both play honestly),
for whom the company can choose a fixed value in [0, 1]. The
utility of company A is the sum of the players’ limit actions,
and the utility of company B is minus the utility of A. What
are the equilibria of this game?
2.1.5. The case of infinite graphs. Consider the DeGroot model
on an infinite graph, with a simple random walk.
• Easy exercise. Give an example of specific private signals
for which the limit A∞ doesn’t exist.
• Easy exercise. Prove that A∞ exists and is equal to S on
non-amenable graphs a.s.
• Harder exercise. Prove that A∞ exists and is equal to S on
general infinite graphs.
2.2. The voter model
This model was described by P. Clifford and A. Sudbury [10] in the
context of a spatial conflict where animals fight over territory (1973)
and further analyzed by A. Holley and T.M. Liggett [23].
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2.2.1. Definition. As in the DeGroot model above, we shall con-
sider a state of the world S ∈ {0, 1} with conditionally i.i.d. Bernoulli
private signals, so that P [Wi = S] = 12 + δ.
We consider binary actions and define them in a way that resembles
our definition of the DeGroot model. We let:
Ai0 = Wi
and for t > 0, all i and all j ∈ ∂i,
P
[
Ait = A
j
t−1
]
= w(i, j),(2)
so that in each round each agent chooses a neighboring agent to emu-
late. We make the following assumptions:
(1) All choices are independent.
(2)
∑
j∈∂iw(i, j) = 1 for all i ∈ V .
(3) i ∈ ∂i for all i ∈ V .
(4) w(i, j) > 0 for all (i, j) ∈ E.
As in the DeGroot model, the last two assumptions are non-standard,
and are made to facilitate the presentation of the results for this model.
We assume that the social network G is finite. We consider both the
general case of a directed strongly connected network, and the special
case of an undirected network.
2.2.2. Questions and answers. We shall ask, with regards to
the voter model, the same three questions that appear in Section 1.6.
(1) Convergence. Does, for each agent i, the limit limtA
i
t exist
almost surely? We shall show that this is indeed the case.
(2) Agreement. Does Ai∞ = A
j
∞ for all (i, j) ∈ V ? Again, we
answer this question in the positive.
(3) Learning. In the case of discrete actions we say that agent
i has learned S if Ai∞ = S. Since we have agreement in this
model, it follows that either all agents learn or all do not learn.
Unlike other models we’ve discussed, we will show that the
answer here is no. Even for large egalitarian networks, learning
doesn’t necessarily holds. We will later discuss a variant of the
voter model where learning holds.
2.2.3. Results. We first note that
Proposition 2.2.1. In the voter model with assumptions (2) all
agents converge to the same action.
Proof. The voter model is a Markov chain. Clearly the states
where Ait = 0 for all i and the state where A
i
t = 1 for all i are absorbing
states of the chain (once you’re there you never move). Moreover, it is
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easy to see that for any other state, there is a sequence of moves of the
chain, each occurring with positive probability, that lead to the all 0 /
all 1 state. From this it follows that the chain will always converge to
either the all 0 or all 1 state. 
We next wish to ask what is the probability that the agents learned
S? For the voter model this chance is never very high as the following
proposition shows:
Theorem 2.2.2 ((Non) Learning in the Voter model). Let A∞ de-
note the limit action for all the agents in the voter model. Then:
(3) P [A∞ = 1|W ] =
∑
i∈V
αiWi,
and
(4) P [A∞ = S|W ] =
∑
i∈V
αi1(Wi = S).
where α = (α1, . . . , αn) is the stationary distirbution of the Markov
chain described by Pw. Moreover,
(5) P [A∞ = S] =
1
2
+ δ.
Proof. Note that Eq. 4 follows immediately from Eq. 3 and that
Eq. 5 follows from Eq. 4 by taking expectation over W . To prove Eq. 3
we build upon a connection to the DeGroot model. Let Dit denote the
action of agent i in the DeGroot model at time t. We are assuming
that the DeGroot model is defined using the same w(i, j) and that the
private signals are identical for the voter and DeGroot model. Under
these assumption it is easy to verify by induction on i and t that
P
[
Ait = 1
]
= Dit.
Thus
P
[
Ai∞ = 1
]
= Di∞ =
∑
i∈V
αiWi,
as needed. 
In the next subsection we will discuss a variant of the voter model
that does lead to learning.
We next briefly discuss the question of the convergence rate of the
voter model. Here again the connection to the Markov chain of the
DeGroot model is paramount (see, e.g., Holley and Liggett [23]). We
won’t discuss this beautiful theory in detail. Instead, we will just dis-
cuss the case of undirected graphs where all the weights are 1.
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Exercise: Consider the voter model on an undirected graph. This
is equivalent to letting w(i, j) = 1/di for all i, where di = |∂i|.
• Show that Xt =
∑
diA
i
t is a martingale.
• Let T be the stopping time where Ait = 0 for all i or Ait = 1
for all i. Show that E [XT ] = E [X0] and use this to deduce
that
P [A∞ = 1|W ] =
∑
i∈V diWi∑
i∈V di
• Let d = maxi di. Show that
E
[
(Xt −Xt−1)2|t < T
] ≥ 1/(2d).
Use this to conclude that
E [T ] /(2d) ≤ E [(XT −X0)2] ≤ n2,
so
E [T ] ≤ 2dn2.
2.2.4. A variant of the voter model. As we just saw, the voter
model does not lead to learning even on large egalitarian networks. It
is natural to ask if there are variants of the model that do. We will now
describe such a variant (see e.g. [5, 29]). For simplicity we consider a
undirected graph G = (V,E) and the following asynchronous dynamics.
• At time t = 0, let A0i = (Wi, 1).
• At each time t ≥ 1 choose an edge e = (i, j) of the graph at
random and continue as follows:
• For all k /∈ {i, j}, let Atk = At−1k .
• Denote (ai, wi) = At−1i and (aj, wj) = At−1j .
• If ai 6= aj and wi = wj = 1, let a′i = ai, a′j = aj and w′i = w′j =
0.
• If ai 6= aj and wi = 1 > wj = 0, let a′i = a′j = ai and w′i = wi
and w′j = wj.
• Similarly, if ai 6= aj and wj = 1 > wi = 0, let a′i = a′j = aj and
w′i = wi and w
′
j = wj.
• if ai 6= aj and wj = wi = 0, let a′i = a′j = 0(1) with probability
1/2 each. Let w′i = w
′
j = 0.
• Otherwise, if ai = aj, let a′i = ai, a′j = aj, wi = w′i, wj = w′j.
• With probability 1/2 let Ati := (a′i, w′i) and Atj := (a′j, w′j).
With probability 1/2 let Ati := (a
′
j, w
′
j) and A
t
j := (a
′
i, w
′
i)
Here is a useful way to think about this dynamics. The n players
all being with opinions given by Wi. Moreover these opinions are all
strong (this is indicated by the second coordinate of the action being 1).
At each round a random edge is chosen and the two agents sharing the
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edge declare their opinions regarding S. If their opinions are identical,
then nothing changes except that with probability 1/2 the agents swap
their location on the edge. If the opinions regarding S differ and one
agent is strong (second coordinate is 1) while the second one is weak
(second coordinate is 0) then the weak agent is convinced by the strong
agent. If the two agents are strong, then they keep their opinion but
become weak. If the two of them are weak, then they both choose the
same opinion at random. At the end of the exchange, the agents again
swap their positions with probability 1/2. We leave the following as an
exercise:
Proposition 2.2.3. Let Ati = (X
t
i , Y
t
i ). Then a.s.
limX ti = X,
where
• X = 1 if ∑iWi > n/2,
• X = 0 if ∑iWi < n/2 and
• P [X = 1] = 1/2 if ∑iWi = n/2.
Thus this variant of the voter model yields optimal learning.
2.3. Deterministic iterated dynamics
A natural deterministic model of discrete opinion exchange dynam-
ics is majority dynamics, in which each agent adopts, at each time
period, the opinion of the majority of its neighbors. This is a model
that has been studied since the 1940’s in such diverse fields as bio-
physics [26], psychology [9] and combinatorics [21].
2.3.1. Definition. In this section, let Ai0 take values in {−1,+1},
and let
Ait+1 = sgn
∑
j∈∂i
Ajt .
we assume that |∂i| is odd, so that there are never cases of indifference
and Ait ∈ {−1,+1} for all t and i. We assume also that the graph is
undirected.
A classical combinatorial result (that has been discovered indepen-
dently repeatedly; see discussion and generalization in [21]) is the fol-
lowing.
Theorem 2.3.1. Let G be a finite undirected graph. Then
Ait+1 = A
i
t−1
for all i, for all t ≥ |E|, and for all initial opinion sets {Aj0}j∈V .
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That is, each agent (and therefore the entire dynamical system)
eventually enters a cycle of period at most two. We prove this below.
A similar result applies to some infinite graphs, as discovered by
Moran [27] and Ginosar and Holzman [20]. Given an agent i, let
nr(G, i) be the number of agents at distance exactly r from i in G. Let
g(G) denote the asymptotic growth rate of G given by
g(G) = lim sup
r
nr(G, i)
1/n.
This can be shown to indeed be independent of i. Then
Theorem 2.3.2 (Ginosar and Holzman, Moran). If G has degree
at most d and g < d+1
d−1 then for each initial opinion set {Aj0}j∈V and
for each i ∈ V there exists a time Ti such that
Ait+1 = A
i
t−1
for all t ≥ Ti.
That is, each agent (but not the entire dynamical system) eventually
enters a cycle of period at most two. We will not give a proof of this
theorem.
In the case of graphs satisfying g(G) < (d + 1)/(d − 1), and in
particular in finite graphs, we shall denote
Ai∞ = lim
t
Ai2t.
This exists surely, by Theorem 2.3.2 above.
In this model we shall consider a state of the world S ∈ {−1,+1}
with conditionally i.i.d. Bernoulli private signals in {−1,+1}, so that
P [Wi = S] = 12 + δ. As above, we set A
i
0 = Wi.
2.3.2. Questions and answers. We ask the usual questions with
regards to this model.
(1) Convergence. While it is easy to show that agents’ opinions
do not necessarily converge in the usual sense, they do converge
to sequences of period at most two. Hence we will consider the
limit action Ai∞ = limtA
i
2t as defined above to be the action
that agent i converges to.
(2) Agreement. This is easily not the case in this model that
Ai∞ = A
j
∞ for all i, j ∈ V . However, in [28] it is shown that
agreement is reached, with high probability, for good enough
expanders.
(3) Learning. Since we do not have agreement in this model, we
will consider a different notion of learning. This notion may
actually be better described as retention of information. We
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define it below. Condorcet’s Jury Theorem [11], in an early
version of the law of large numbers, states that given n con-
ditionally i.i.d. private signals, one can estimate S correctly,
except with probability that tends to zero with n. The ques-
tion of retention of information asks whether this still holds
when we introduce correlations “naturally” by the process of
majority dynamics.
Let G be finite, undirected graphs. Let
Sˆ = argmaxs∈{−1,+1} P
[
S = s
∣∣A1∞, . . . , A|V |∞ ] .
This is the maximum a-posteriori (MAP) estimator of S, given
the limit actions. Let
ι(G, δ) = P
[
Sˆ 6= S
]
,
where G and δ appear implicitly in the right hand side. This
is the probability that the best possible estimator of S, given
the limit actions, is not equal to S.
Finally, let {Gn}n∈N be a sequence of finite, undirected
graphs. We say that we have retention of information on the
sequence {Gn} if ι(Gn, δ) →n 0 for all δ > 0. This definition
was first introduced, to the best of our knowledge, in Mossel,
Neeman and Tamuz [28].
Is information retained on all sequences of growing graphs?
The answer, as we show below, is no. However, we show that
information is retained on sequences of transitive graphs [28].
2.3.3. Convergence. To prove convergence to period at most two
for finite graphs, we define the Lyapunov functional
Lt =
∑
(i,j)∈E
(Ait+1 − Ajt)2.
We prove Theorem 2.3.1 by showing that Lt is monotone decreasing,
that Ait+1 = A
i
t−1 whenever Lt − Lt−1 = 0, and that Lt = Lt−1 for all
t > |E|. This proof appears (for a more general setting) in Goles and
Olivos [21]. For this we will require the following definitions:
J it =
(
Ait+1 − Ait−1
)∑
j∈∂i
Ajt
and
Jt =
∑
i∈V
J it .
Claim 2.3.3. J it ≥ 0 and J it = 0 iff Ait+1 = Ait−1.
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Proof. This follows immediately from the facts that
Ait+1 = sgn
∑
j∈∂i
Ajt ,
and that
∑
j∈∂iA
j
t is never zero. 
It follows that
Corollary 2.3.4. Jt ≥ 0 and Jt = 0 iff Ait+1 = Ait−1 for all i ∈ V .
We next that Lt is monotone decreasing.
Proposition 2.3.5. Lt − Lt−1 = −Jt.
Proof. By definition,
Lt − Lt−1 =
∑
(i,j)∈E
(Ait+1 − Ajt)2 −
∑
(i,j)∈E
(Ait − Ajt−1)2.
Opening the parentheses and canceling identical terms yields
Lt − Lt−1 = −2
∑
(i,j)∈E
Ait+1A
j
t + 2
∑
(i,j)∈E
AitA
j
t−1.
Since the graph is undirected we can change variable on the right sum
and arrive at
Lt − Lt−1 = −2
∑
(i,j)∈E
Ait+1A
j
t − AjtAit−1
= −2
∑
(i,j)∈E
(
Ait+1 − Ait−1
)
Ajt .
Finally, applying the definitions of J it and Jt yields
Lt − Lt−1 = −
∑
i∈V
J it = −Jt.

Proof of Theorem 2.3.1. Since L0 ≤ |E|, Lt ≤ Lt−1 and Lt
is integer, it follows that Lt 6= Lt−1 at most |E| times. Hence, by
Proposition 2.3.5, Jt > 0 at most |E| times. But if Jt = 0, then the
state of the system at time t + 1 is the same as it was at time t − 1,
and so it has entered a cycle of length at most two. Hence Jt = 0 for
all t > |E|, and the claim follows. 
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2.3.4. Retention of information. In this section we prove that
(1) There exists a sequence of finite, undirected graphs {Gn}n∈N
of size tending to infinity such that ι(G, δ) does not tend to
zero for any 0 < δ < 1
2
.
(2) Let {Gn}n∈N be a sequence of finite, undirected, connected
transitive graphs of size tending to infinity. Then ι(Gn, δ)→n
0, and, furthermore, if we let Gn have n vertices, then
ι(Gn, δ) ≤ Cn−
Cδ
log(1/δ) .
for some universal constant C > 0.
A transitive graph is a graph for which, for every two vertices i and
j there exists a graph homomorphism σ such that σ(i) = j. A graph
homomorphism h is a permutation on the vertices such that (i, j) ∈
E iff (σ(i), σ(j)) ∈ E. Equivalently, the group Aut(G) ≤ S|V | acts
transitively on V .
Berger [7] gives a sequence of graphs {Hn}n∈N with size tending to
infinity, and with the following property. In each Hn = (V,E) there
is a subset of vertices W of size 18 such that if Ait = −1 for some t
and all i ∈ W then Aj∞ = −1 for all j ∈ V . That is, if all the vertices
in W share the same opinion, then eventually all agents acquire that
opinion.
Proposition 2.3.6. ι(Hn, δ) ≥ (1− δ)18.
Proof. With probability (1 − δ)18 we have that Ai0 = −S for all
i ∈ W . Hence Aj∞ = −S for all j ∈ V , with probability at least
(1− δ)18. Since the MAP estimator Sˆ can be shown to be a symmetric
and monotone function of Aj∞, it follows that in this case Sˆ = −S, and
so
ι(Hn, δ) = P
[
Sˆ 6= S
]
≥ (1− δ)18.

We next turn to prove the following result
Theorem 2.3.7. Let G a finite, undirected, connected transitive
graph with n vertices, n odd. then
ι(G, δ) ≤ Cn− Cδlog(1/δ) .
for some universal constant C > 0.
Let Sˆ = sgn
∑
i∈V A
i
∞ be the result of a majority vote on the limit
actions. Since n is odd then Sˆ takes values in {−1,+1}. Note that
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Sˆ is measurable in the initial private signals Wi. Hence there exists a
function f : {−1,+1}n → {−1,+1} such that
Sˆ = f(W1, . . . ,Wn).
Claim 2.3.8. f satisfies the following conditions.
(1) Symmetry. For all x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {−1,+1}n it holds
that f(−x1, . . . ,−xn) = −f(x1, . . . , xn).
(2) Monotonicity. f(x1, . . . , xn) = 1 implies that f(x1, . . . , xi−1, 1, xi+1, . . . , xn) =
1 for all i ∈ [n].
(3) Anonymity. There exists a subgroup G ≤ Sn that acts tran-
sitively on [n] such that f(xσ(1), . . . , xσ(n)) = f(x1, . . . , xn) for
all x ∈ {−1,+1}n and σ ∈ G.
This claim is straightforward to verify, with anonymity a conse-
quence of the fact that the graph is transitive.
2.3.4.1. Influences, Russo’s formula, the KKL theorem and Tala-
grand’s theorem. To prove Theorem 2.3.7 we use Russo’s formula, a
classical result in probability that we prove below.
Let X1, . . . , Xn be random variables taking values in {−1,+1}. For
−1
2
< δ < 1
2
, let Pδ be the distribution such that Pδ [Xi = +1] =
1
2
+ δ independently. Let g : {−1,+1}n → {−1,+1} be a monotone
function (as defined above in Claim 2.3.8). Let Y = g(X), where
X = (X1, . . . , Xn).
Denote by τi : {−1,+1}n → {−1,+1}n the function given by
τi(x1, . . . , xn) = (x1, . . . , xi−1,−xi, xi+1, . . . , xn). We define the influ-
ence Iδi of i ∈ [n] on Y as the probability that i is pivotal:
Iδi = Pδ [g(τi(X)) 6= g(X)] .
That is Iδi is the probability that the value of Y = g(X) changes, if we
change Xi.
Theorem 2.3.9 (Russo’s formula).
dPδ [Y = +1]
dδ
=
∑
i
Iδi ,
Proof. Let Pδ1,...,δn be the distribution on X such that
Pδ1,...,δn [Xi = +1] = δi.
We prove the claim by showing that
∂Pδ1,...,δn [Y = +1]
∂δi
= Pδ1,...,δn [g(τi(X)) 6= g(X)] ,
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and noting that Pδ,...,δ = Pδ, and that for general differentiable h :
Rn → R it holds that
∂h(x, . . . , x)
∂x
=
∑
i
∂h(x1, . . . , xn)
∂xi
.
Indeed, if we denote E = Eδ1,...,δn and P = Pδ1,...,δn , then
∂
∂δi
P [Y = +1] =
∂
∂δi
1
2
E [g(X)] .
Denote x−i = (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn). Then
E [g(X)] =
∑
x
P [X−i = x−i, Xi = xi] g(x)
=
∑
x
P [X−i = x−i]P [Xi = xi] g(x),
where the second equality follows from the independence of the Xi’s.
Hence
∂
∂δi
Pδ1,...,δn [Y = +1] =
∂
∂δi
1
2
∑
x
P [X−i = x−i]P [Xi = xi] g(x)
= 1
2
∑
x
P [X−i = x−i]xig(x),
where the second equality follows from the fact that P [X = +1] = δi
and P [X = −1] = 1 − δi. Now,
∑
xi
xig(x) is equal to zero when
g(τi(x)) = g(x), and to two otherwise, since g is monotone. Hence
∂
∂δi
Pδ1,...,δn [Y = +1] =
∑
x
P [X−i = x−i]1(g(τi(x)) 6= g(x))
= P [g(τi(X)) 6= g(X)] .

Kahn, Kalai and Linial [24] prove a deep result on Boolean func-
tions on the hypercube (i.e., functions from {−1,+1}n to {−1,+1}),
which was later generalized by Talagrand [40]. Their theorem states
that there must exist an i with influence at least O(log n/n).
Theorem 2.3.10 (Talagrand). Let δ = maxi I
δ
i and qδ = Pδ [Y = 1].
Then ∑
i
Iδi ≥ K log (1/δ) qδ(1− qδ).
for some universal constant K.
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Using this result, the proof of Theorem 2.3.7 is straightforward, and
we leave it as an exercise to the reader.

CHAPTER 3
Bayesian Models
In this chapter we study Bayesian agents. We call an agent Bayesian
when its actions maximize the expectation of some utility function.
This is a model which comes from Economics, where, in fact, its use
is the default paradigm. We will focus on the case in which an agent’s
utility depends only on the state of the world S and on its actions, and
is the same for all agents and all time periods.
3.0.5. Toy model: continuous actions. Before defining general
Bayesian models, we consider the following simple model on an undi-
rected connected graph. Let S ∈ {0, 1} be a binary state of the world,
and let the private signals be i.i.d. conditioned on S.
We denote by H it the information available to agent i at time t.
This includes its private signal, and the actions of its neighbors in the
previous time periods:
H it =
{
Wi, A
j
t′ : j ∈ ∂i, t′ < t
}
.(6)
The actions are given by
Ait = P
[
S = 1
∣∣H it] .(7)
That is, each agent’s action is its belief, or the probability that it assigns
to the event S = 1, given what it knows.
For this model we prove the following results:
• Convergence. The actions of each agents converge almost
surely to some Ai∞. This is a direct consequence of the obser-
vation that {H it}t∈N is a filtration, and so {Ait}t∈N is a bounded
martingale. Note that this does not use the independence of
the signals.
• Agreement. The limit actions Ai∞ are almost surely the same
for all i ∈ V . This follows from the fact that if i and j are
connected then Ai∞ +A
j
∞ ∈ H∞i ∩H∞j and if Ai∞ and Aj∞ are
not a.s. equal then:
E
[(
1
2
(Ai∞ + A
j
∞)− S
)2]
< max
(
E
[
(Ai∞ − S)2
]
,E
[
(Aj∞ − S)2
] )
.
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Note again that this argument does not use the independence
of the signals. We will show this in further generality in Sec-
tion 3.2 below. This is a consequence of a more general agree-
ment theorem that applies to all Bayesian models, which we
prove in Section 3.1.
• Learning. When |V | = n, we show in Section 3.4 that Ai∞ =
P [S = 1|W1, . . . ,Wn]. This is the strongest possible learning
result; the agents’ actions are the same as they would be if
each agent knew all the others’ private signals. In particular,
it follows that P [round (Ai∞) 6= S] is exponentially small in n.
This result crucially relies on the independence of the signals
as the following example shows.
Example 3.0.11. Consider two agents 1, 2 with Wi = 0 or 1 with
probability 1/2 each and independently, and S = W1+W2 mod 2. Note
that here Ati = 1/2 for i = 1, 2 and all t, while it is trivial to recover S
from W1,W2.
3.0.6. Definitions and some observations. Following our gen-
eral framework (see Section 1.5) we shall (mostly) consider a state of the
world S ∈ {0, 1} chosen from the uniform distribution, with condition-
ally i.i.d. private signals. We will consider both discrete and continuous
actions, and each shall correspond to a different utility function. We
shall denote by U it agent i’s utility function at time t, and deal with
myopic agents, or agents who strive to maximize, at each period t, the
expectation of U it . We will assume that U
i
t = u(S,A
i
t) for some con-
tinuous function u : {0, 1} × [0, 1]→ [0, 1] that is independent of i and
t.
As in the toy model above, we denote by H it the information avail-
able to agent i at time t, including its private signal, and the actions
of its neighbors in the previous time periods:
H it =
{
Wi, A
j
t′ : j ∈ ∂i, t′ < t
}
.(8)
Given a utility function U it = u(S,A
i
t), a Bayesian agent will choose
Ait = argmaxs E
[
u(S, s)
∣∣H it] .(9)
Equivalently, one can define Ait as a random variable which, out of all
σ(H it)-measurable random variables, maximizes the expected utility:
Ait = argmaxA∈σ(Hit) E [u(S,A)] .(10)
We assume that in cases of indifference (i.e., two actions that maximize
the expected utility) the agents chooses one according to some known
deterministic rule.
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We consider two utility functions; a discrete one that results in dis-
crete actions, and a continuous one that results in continuous actions.
The first utility function is
U it = 1(A
i
t = S).(11)
Although this function is not continuous as a function from [0, 1] to
[0, 1], we will, in this case, consider the set of allowed actions to be
{0, 1}, and so u : {0, 1} × {0, 1} → R will be continuous again.
To maximize the expectation of U it conditioned on H
i
t , a myopic
agent will choose the action
Ait = argmaxs∈{0,1} P
[
S = s
∣∣H it] ,(12)
which will take values in {0, 1}.
We will also consider the following utility function, which corre-
sponds to continuous actions:
U it = 1−
(
Ait − S
)2
.(13)
To maximize the expectation of this function, an agent will choose the
action
Ait = P
[
S = 1
∣∣H it] .(14)
This action will take values in [0, 1].
An important concept in the context of Bayesian agents is that of
belief. We define agent i’s belief at time t to be
Bit = P
[
S = 1
∣∣H it] .(15)
This is the probability that S = 1, conditioned on all the information
available to i at time t. It is easy to check that, in the discrete action
case, the action is the rounding of the belief. In the continuous action
case the action equals the belief.
An important distinction is between bounded and unbounded private
signals [39]. We say that the private signal Wi is unbounded when
the private belief Bi0 = P [S = 1|Wi] can be arbitrarily close to both 1
and 0; formally, when the convex closure of the support of Bi0 is equal
to [0, 1]. We say that private signals are bounded when there exists an
 > 0 such Bi0 is supported on [, 1− ].
Unbounded private signals can be thought of as being “unboundedly
strong”, and therefore could be expected to promote learning. This is
indeed the case, as we show below.
The following claim follows directly from the fact that the sequence
of sigma-algebras σ(H it) is a filtration.
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Claim 3.0.12. The sequence of beliefs of agent i, {Bit}t∈N, is a
bounded martingale.
It follows that a limiting belief almost surely exists, and we can
define
Bi∞ = lim
t→∞
Bit.(16)
Furthermore, if we let H i∞ = ∪tH it , then
Bi∞ = P
[
S = 1
∣∣H i∞] .(17)
We would like to also define the limiting action of agent i. However,
it might be the case that the actions of an agent do not converge. We
therefore define Ait to be an action set, given by the set of accumulation
points of the sequence Ait. In the case that A
i
∞ is a singleton {x}, we
denote Ai∞ = x, in a slight abuse of notation. Note that in the case
that actions take values in {0, 1} (as we will consider below), Ai∞ is
either equal to 1, to 0, or to {0, 1}.
The following claim is straightforward.
Claim 3.0.13. Fix a continuous utility function u. Then
lim
t
E
[
u(S,Ait)
∣∣H it] = E [u(S, a)∣∣H i∞] ≥ E [u(S, b)∣∣H i∞]
for all a ∈ Ai∞ and all b.
That is, any action in Ai∞ is optimal (that is, maximizes the ex-
pected utility), given what the agent knows at the limit t → ∞. It
follows that
E
[
u(S, a)
∣∣H i∞] = E [u(S, b)∣∣H i∞]
for all a, b ∈ Ai∞. It follows that in the case of actions in {0, 1},
Ai∞ = {0, 1} only if i is asymptotically indifferent, or expects the same
utility from both 0 and 1.
We will show that an oft-occurring phenomenon in the Bayesian
setting is agreement on limit actions, so that Ai∞ is indeed a singleton,
and Ai∞ = A
j
∞ for all i, j ∈ V . In this case we can define A∞ as the
common limit action.
3.1. Agreement
In this section we show that regardless of the utility function, and, in
fact, regardless of the private signal structure, Bayesian agents always
reach agreement, except in cases of indifference. This theorem origi-
nated in the work of Aumann [2], with contributions by Geanakoplos
and others [19, 38]. It first appeared as below in Gale and Kariv [17].
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Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille [35] correct an error in the proof and
extend this result to the even more general setting of strategic agents,
which we shall not discuss.
Theorem 3.1.1 (Gale and Kariv). Fix a utility function U it =
u(S,Ait), and consider (i, j) ∈ E. Then
E
[
u(S, ai)
∣∣H i∞] = E [u(S, aj)∣∣H i∞]
for any ai ∈ Ai∞ and aj ∈ Aj∞.
That is, any action in Aj∞ is optimal, given what i knows, and so
has the same expected utility as any action in Ai∞. Note that this
theorem applies even when private signals are not conditionally i.i.d.,
and when S is not necessarily binary.
Eq. 10 is a particularly useful way to think of the agents’ actions,
as the proof of the following claim shows.
Claim 3.1.2. For all (i, j) ∈ E it holds that
(1) E
[
U it+1
] ≥ E [U it ].
(2) E
[
U it+1
] ≥ E [U jt ].
Proof. (1) Since σ(H it) is included in σ(H
i
t+1), the maximum
in Eq. 10 is taken over a larger space for Ait+1 than it is for A
i
t,
and therefore a value at least as high is achieved.
(2) Since Ajt is σ(H
i
t+1)-measurable, it follows from Eq. 10 that
E
[
u(S,Ait+1)
] ≥ E [u(S,Ajt)].

The proof of the following corollary is left as exercise to the reader.
Corollary 3.1.3. For all i, j ∈ V ,
lim
t
E
[
U it
]
= lim
t
E
[
U ij
]
The proof of Theorem 3.1.1 follows directly from Corollary 3.1.3,
Claim 3.0.13, and the fact that Aj∞ is σ(H
i
∞)-measurable whenever
(i, j) ∈ E.
3.2. Continuous utility models
As mentioned above, in the case that the utility function is
U it = 1−
(
Ait − S
)2
,
it follows readily that
Ait = B
i
t = P
[
S = 1
∣∣H it] ,
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and so, by Claim 3.0.12, the actions of each agent form a martingale,
and furthermore each converge to a singleton Ai∞. Aumann’s celebrated
Agreement Theorem from the paper titled “Agreeing to Disagree” [2],
as followed-up by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis in the paper titled
“We can’t disagree forever” [19], implies that all these limiting actions
are equal. This follows from Theorem 3.1.1.
Theorem 3.2.1. In the continuous utility model
Ai∞ = P
[
S = 1
∣∣H i∞]
and furthermore
Ai∞ = A
j
∞
for all i, j ∈ V .
Note again that this holds also for private signals that are not con-
ditionally i.i.d.
Proof. As was mentioned above, since the actions Ait are equal to
the beliefs Bit, they are a bounded martingale and therefore converge.
Hence Ai∞ = B
i
∞ and, by Eq. 17,
Ai∞ = P
[
S = 1
∣∣H i∞] .
Assume (i, j) ∈ E. By Theorem 3.1.1 we have that
E
[
u(S,Ai∞)
∣∣H i∞] = E [u(S,Aj∞)∣∣H i∞] .
It hence follows from Claim 3.0.13 that both Ai∞ and A
j
∞ maximize
E [u(S, ·)|H i∞]. But the unique maximizer is P [S = 1|H i∞], and so
Ai∞ = A
j
∞. For general i and j, the claim now follows from the fact
that the graph is strongly connected. 
3.3. Bounds on number of rounds in finite probability spaces
In this section we consider the case of a finite probability space.
Let S be binary, and let the private signals W = (W1, . . . ,W|V |) be
chosen from an arbitrary (not necessarily conditionally independent)
distribution over a finite joint probability space of size M . Consider
general utility functions U it = u(S,A
i
t).
The following theorem is a strengthening of a theorem by Geanako-
plos [18], using ideas from [32].
Theorem 3.3.1 (Geanakoplos). Let d be the diameter of the graph
G. Then the actions of each agent converge after at most M · |V | time
periods:
Ait = A
i
t′
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for all i ∈ V and all t, t′ ≥ M · |V |. Furthermore, the number of time
periods t such that Ait+1 6= Ait is at most M .
The key observation is that each sigma-algebra σ(H it) is generated
by some subset of the set of random variables
{
1(W = m)
}
m∈{1,...,M}.
Proof. By Eq. 10, if σ(H it) = σ(H
i
t′) then A
i
t = A
i
t′ . It remains
to show, then, that σ(H it) = σ(H
i
t′) for all t, t
′ ≥ M · |V |, and that
σ(H it) 6= σ(H it+1) at most M times.
Now, every sub-sigma-algebra of σ(W ) (such as σ(H it)) is simply a
partition of the finite space {1, . . . ,M}. Furthermore, for every i, the
sequence σ(H it) is a filtration, so that each σ(H
i
t+1) is a refinement of
σ(H it). A simple combinatorial argument shows that any such sequence
has at most M unique partitions, and so σ(H it) 6= σ(H it+1) at most M
times.
Finally, note that if σ(H it) = σ(H
i
t+1) for all i ∈ V at some time t,
then this is also the case for all later time periods. Hence, as long as
the process hasn’t ended, it must be that σ(H it) 6= σ(H it+1) for some
agent i. It follows that the process ends after at most M · |V | time
periods.

3.4. From agreement to learning
This section is adapted from Mossel, Sly and Tamuz [30].
In this section we prove two very general results that relate agree-
ment and learning in Bayesian models. As in our general framework,
we consider a binary state of the world S ∈ {0, 1} chosen from the
uniform distribution, with conditionally i.i.d. private signals. We do
not define actions, but only study what can be said when, at the end
of the process (whatever it may be) the agents reach agreement.
Formally, consider a finite set of agents of size n, or an countably
infinite set of agents, each with a private signal Wi. Let Fi be the
sigma-algebra that represents what is known by agent i. We require
that Wi is Fi measurable (i.e., each agent knows its own private signal),
and that each Fi is a sub-sigma-algebra of σ(W1, . . . ,Wn). Let agent
i’s belief be
Bi = P [S = 1|Fi] ,
and let agent i’s action be
Ai = argmaxs∈{0,1} P [S = s|Fi] .
We let Ai = {0, 1} when both maximize P [S = s|Fi].
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We say that agents agree on beliefs when there exists a random
variable B such that almost surely Bi = B for all agents i. Likewise,
we say that agents agree on actions when there exists a random variable
A such that almost surely Ai = A for all agents i. Such agreement arises
often as a result of repeated interaction of Bayesian agents.
We show below that agreement on beliefs is a sufficient condition
for learning, and in fact implies the strongest possible type of learning.
We also show that when private signals are unbounded beliefs then
agreement on actions is also a condition for learning.
3.4.1. Agreement on beliefs. The following theorem and its
proof is taken from Mossel, Sly and Tamuz [30]. This theorem also
admits a proof as a corollary of some well known results on rational
expectation equilibria (see, e.g., [14, 33]), but we will not delve into
this topic.
Theorem 3.4.1. Let the private signals (W1, . . . ,Wn) be indepen-
dent conditioned on S, and let the agents agree on beliefs. Then
B = P [S = 1|W1, . . . ,Wn] .
That is, if the agents have exchanged enough information to agree
on beliefs, they have exchanged all the relevant information, in the
sense that they have the same belief that they would have had they
shared all the information.
Proof. Denote agent i’s private log-likelihood ratio by
Zi = log
dµi1
dµi0
(Wi).
Since P [S = 1] = P [S = 0] = 1/2 it follows that
Zi = log
P [S = 1|Wi]
P [S = 0|Wi] .
Denote Z =
∑
i∈[n] Zi. Then, since the private signals are condi-
tionally independent, it follows by Bayes’ rule that
P [S = 1|W1, . . . ,Wn] = logit (Z) ,(18)
where logit(z) = ez/(ez + e−z).
Since
B = P [S = 1|B] = E [P [S = 1|B,W1, . . . ,Wn]|B]
then
B = E [logit(Z)|B] ,(19)
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since, given the private signals (W1, . . . ,Wn), further conditioning on
B (which is a function of the private signals) does not change the
probability of the event S = 1.
Our goal is to show that B = P [S = 1|W1, . . . ,Wn]. We will do
this by showing that conditioned on B, Z and logit(Z) are linearly
independent. It will follow that conditioned on B, Z is constant, so
that Z = Z(B) and
B = P [S = 1|B] = P [S = 1|Z(B)] = P [S = 1|W1, . . . ,Wn] .
By the law of total expectation we have that
E [Zi · logit(Z)|B] = E [E [Zilogit(Z)|B,Zi]|B] .
Note that E [Zilogit(Z)|B,Zi] = ZiE [logit(Z)|B,Zi] and so we can
write
E [Zi · logit(Z)|B] = E [ZiE [logit(Z)|B,Zi]|B] .
Since Zi is Fi measurable, and since, by Eq. 19, B = E [logit(Z)|Fi] =
E [logit(Z)|B], then B = E [logit(Z)|B,Zi] and so it follows that
E [Zi · logit(Z)|B] = E [ZiB|B] = B · E [Zi|B] = E [logit(Z)|B] · E [ZiB|B] .
(20)
where the last equality is another substitution of Eq. 19. Summing this
equation (20) over i ∈ [n] we get that
E [Z · logit(Z)|B] = E [logit(Z)|B]E [Z|B] .(21)
Now, since logit(Z) is a monotone function of Z, by Chebyshev’s
sum inequality we have that
E [Z · logit(Z)|B] ≥ E [logit(Z)|B]E [Z|B](22)
with equality only if Z (or, equivalently logit(Z)) is constant. Hence
Z is constant conditioned on B and the proof is concluded.

3.4.2. Agreement on actions. In this section we consider the
case that the agents agree on actions, rather than beliefs. The bound-
edness of private beliefs plays an important role in the case of agree-
ment on actions. When private beliefs are bounded then agreement on
actions does not imply learning, as shown by the following example,
which is reminiscent of Bala and Goyal’s [3] royal family. However,
when private beliefs are unbounded then learning does occur with high
probability, as we show below.
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Example 3.4.2. Let there be n > 100 agents, and call the first hun-
dred “the Senate”. The private signals are bits that are independently
equal to S with probability 2/3. Let
AS = argmaxa P [S = a|W1, . . . ,W100] ,
and let Fi = σ(Wi, AS).
This example describes the case in which the information available
to each agent is the decision of the senate - which aggregates the sen-
ators’ private information optimally - and its own private signal. It is
easy to convince oneself that Ai = AS for all i ∈ [n], and so actions
are indeed agreed upon. However, the probability that AS 6= S - i.e.,
the Senate makes a mistake - is constant and does not depend on the
number of agents n. Hence the probability that the agents choose the
wrong action does not tend to zero as n tends to infinity. This cannot
be the case when private beliefs are unbounded, as Mossel, Sly and
Tamuz [30] show.
Theorem 3.4.3 (Mossel, Sly and Tamuz). Let the private sig-
nals (W1, . . . ,Wn) be i.i.d. conditioned on S, and have unbounded be-
liefs. Let the agents agree on actions. Then there exists a sequence
q(n) = q(n, µ0, µ1), depending only on the conditional private signal
distributions µ1 and µ0, such that q(n)→ 1 as n→∞, and
P [A = S] ≥ q(n).
In particular,
q(n) ≤ min
>0
max
{
2
1− ,
4
nP [Bi < |S = 0]
}
.
For the case of a countably infinite set of agent, we prove (using an
essentially identical technique) the following similar statement.
Theorem 3.4.4. Identify the set of agents with N, let the private
signals (W1,W2, . . .) be i.i.d. conditioned on S, and have unbounded
beliefs. Let all but a vanishing fraction of the agents agree on actions.
That is, let there exist a random variable A such that almost surely
lim sup
n
1
n
|{i ∈ N : Ai 6= A}| = 0.
Then P [A = S] = 1.
Recall that Bi0 denoted the probability of S = 1 given agent i’s
private signal:
Bi0 = P [S = 1|Wi] .
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The condition of unbounded beliefs can be equivalently formulated to
be that for any  > 0 it holds that P [Bi0 < ] > 0 and P [Bi0 > 1− ] >
0.
We shall need two standard lemmas to prove this theorem.
Lemma 3.4.5. P [S = 0|Bi0 < ] > 1− .
Proof. Since Bi0 is a function of Wi then
P
[
S = 1
∣∣Bi0 = bi] = E [P [S = 1|Wi]∣∣Bi0(Wi) = bi] = E [Bi0∣∣Bi0 = bi] = bi,
and so P [S = 1|Bi0] = Bi0. It follows that P [S = 0|Bi0] = 1 − Bi0, and
so P [S = 0|Bi0 < ] > 1− . 
Lemma 3.4.6 below is a version of Chebyshev’s inequality, quantify-
ing the idea that the expectation of a random variable Z, conditioned
on some event A, cannot be much lower than its unconditional expec-
tation when A has high probability.
Lemma 3.4.6. Let Z be a real valued random variable with finite
variance, and let A be an event. Then
E [Z]−
√
V ar [Z]
P [A]
≤ E [Z|A] ≤ E [Z] +
√
V ar [Z]
P [A]
Proof. By Cauchy-Schwarz
|E [Z1(A)]− E [Z]P [A] | = |E [(Z − E [Z]) · 1(A)] | ≤
√
V ar [Z]P [A].
Dividing by P [A] and noting that E [Z1(A)] /P [A] = E [Z|A] we obtain
the statement of the lemma. 
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.4.4.
Proof of Theorem 3.4.4. Consider a set of agents N who agree
(except for a vanishing fraction) on the action. Assume by contradic-
tion that q = P [A 6= 0|S = 0] > 0.
Recall that Bi = P [S = 1|Fi]. Since P [S = 1|Bi0] = Bi0,
E
[
Bi
∣∣Bi0] = E [P [S = 1|Fi]∣∣Bi0] = P [S = 1∣∣Bi0] = Bi0.
Applying Markov’s inequality toBi we have that P
[
Bi ≥ 12
∣∣Bi0 < ] <
2, and in particular
P
[
Ai 6= 0, S = 0
∣∣Bi0 < ] = P [Bi ≥ 12 , S = 0∣∣Bi0 < ] < 2
so
P
[
Ai 6= 0, S = 0, Bi0 < 
] ≤ 2P [Bi0 < ]
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Denote
K(n) =
1
n
∑
i∈[n]
1(Bi0 < ) =
1
n
∑
i∈[n]
1(Bi0 < ,Ai = 0) +
1
n
∑
i∈[n]
1(Bi0 < ,Ai 6= 0)
(23)
Let K1(n) denote the first sum and K2(n) denote the second sum.
From our assumption that a vanishing fraction of agents disagree it
follows that a.s.
lim supE [K1(n)|A 6= 0, S = 0]
≤ 1
q
lim supE [K1(n)|A 6= 0]
≤ 1
q
lim supE
 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
1(Ai = 0)
∣∣∣∣∣∣A 6= 0
 = 0.
It also follows that for all n
E [K2(n)|A 6= 0, S = 0] ≤ 1
q
E [K2(n), A 6= 0, S = 0] ≤ 2P [B
i
0 < ]
q
.
Thus
lim sup
n
E [K(n)|A 6= 0, S = 0] ≤ 2P [B
i
0 < ]
q
.
We hence bound E [K|A 6= 0, S = 0] from above. We will now
bound it from above to obtain a contradiction.
Applying lemma 3.4.6 to K and the event “A 6= 0” (under the
conditional measure S = 0) yields that
E [K(n)|A 6= 0, S = 0] ≥ E [K(n)|S = 0]−
√
V ar [K(n)|S = 0]
q
.
Since the agents’ private signals (and hence their private beliefs) are in-
dependent conditioned on S = 0, K (conditioned on S) is the average of
n i.i.d. variables. Hence V ar [K(n)|S = 0] = n−1V ar [1(Bi0 < )|S = 0]
and E [K(n)|S = 0] = P [Bi0 < |S = 0]. Thus we have that
E [K(n)|A 6= 0, S = 0] ≥ P [Bi0 < ∣∣S = 0]− n−1/2
√
V ar [1(Bi0 < )|S = 0]
q
.
(24)
and so
lim inf
n
E [K(n)|Ai 6= 0, S = 0] ≥ P
[
Bi0 < 
∣∣S = 0]
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Joining the lower bound with the upper bound we obtain that
P
[
Bi0 < 
∣∣S = 0] ≤ 2P [Bi0 < ]
q
,
and applying Bayes rule we obtain
q <

P [S = 0|Bi0 < ]
.
Since by Lemma 3.4.5 above we know that P [S = 0|Bi0 < ] > 1−,
then
q <

1− .
Since this holds for all , we have shown that q = 0, which is a contra-
diction. 
3.5. Sequential Models
In this section we consider a classical class of learning models called
sequential models. We retain a binary state of the world S and
conditionally i.i.d. private signals, but relax two assumption.
• We no longer assume that the graph G is strongly connected.
In fact, we consider the particular case that the set of agents
is countably infinite, identify it with N, let and (i, j) ∈ E iff
j < i. That is, the agents are ordered, and each agent observes
the actions of its predecessors.
• We assume that each agent acts once, after observing the ac-
tions of its predecessors. That is, agent i acts only once, at
time i.
In this section, we denote agent i’s (single) action by Ai. Hence agent
i’s information when taking its action, which we denote by Hi, is
Hi = {Wi, Aj : j < i}.
We likewise denote agent i’s belief at time i by Bi = P [S = 1|Hi]. We
assume discrete utilities, so that
Ai = argmaxs∈{0,1} P [S = s|Hi] ,
and let Ai = 1 when P [S = 1|Hi] = 1/2.
Since each agent acts only once, we explore a different notion of
learning in this section. The question we consider is the following:
when is it the case that limi→∞Ai = S with probability one? Since the
graph is fixed, the answer to this question depends only on the private
signal distributions µ0 and µ1.
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This model (in a slightly different form) was introduced indepen-
dently by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch [8], and Banerjee [4].
A significant later contribution was is that of Smith and Sørensen [39].
An interesting phenomenon that arises in this model is that of an
information cascade. An information cascade is said to occur if, given
an agent i’s predecessor’s actions, i’s action does not depend on its
private signal. This happens if the previous agents’ actions present
such compelling evidence towards the event that (say) S = 1, that any
realization of the private signal would not change this conclusion. Once
this occurs - that is, once one agent’s action does not depend on its
private signal - then this will also hold for all the agents who act later.
3.5.1. The external observer at infinity. An important tool
in the analysis of this model is the introduction of an external observer
x that observes all the agents’ actions but none of their private signals.
We denote by Hxi = {Aj : j < i} the information available to x at
time i, and denote by
Bxi = P [S = 1|Hxi ]
and
Bx∞ = lim
i
Bxi = P [S = 1|Hx∞]
the beliefs of x at times t and infinity respectively, where, as before,
Hx∞ = ∪iHxi . The same martingale argument used above can also be
used here to show that the limit Bx∞ indeed exists and satisfies the
equality above.
A more subtle argument reveals that the likelihood ratio
Lxi =
1−Bxi
Bxi
is also a martingale, conditioned on S = 1. This fact won’t be used
below. See Smith and Sørensen [39] for a proof.
The martingale {Bxi } converges almost surely to Bx∞ in [0, 1], and
conditioned on S = 1, Bx∞ has support ⊆ (0, 1]. The reason that Bx∞ 6=
0 when conditioning on S = 1, is the fact that P [S = 1|Bx∞] = Bx∞,
and so P [S = 1|Bx∞ = 0] = 0.
We also define actions for x, given by
Axi = argmaxs∈{0,1} P [S = s|Hxi ] = round (Bxi ) .
We again assume that in cases of indifference, the action 1 is chosen.
Claim 3.5.1. Axi+1 = Ai
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That is, the external observer simply copies, at time t + 1, the
action of agent t. This follows immediately from the fact that Ai is
σ(Hi)-measurable, and so H
x
i+1 ⊆ Hi. It follows that limiAi = limiAxi ,
and so we have learning - in the sense we defined above for this section
by limiAi = S - iff the external observer learns in the usual sense of
limiA
x
i = S.
3.5.2. The agents’ calculation. We write out each agent’s cal-
culation of its belief Bi, from which follows its action Ai. This is more
easily done by calculating the likelihood ratio
Li =
1−Bi
Bi
.
By Bayes’ law, since P [S = 1] = P [S = 0] = 1
2
, and since Hi =
(Hxi ,Wi)
Li =
P [S = 0|Hi]
P [S = 1|Hi] =
P [Hi|S = 0]
P [Hi|S = 1] =
P [Hxi ,Wi|S = 0]
P [Hxi ,Wi|S = 1]
.
Since the private signals are conditionally i.i.d., Wi is conditionally
independent of Hxi , and so
Li =
P [Hxi |S = 0]
P [Hxi |S = 1]
· P [Wi|S = 0]
P [Wi|S = 1] .
We denote by Pi the private likelihood ratio P [Wi|S = 0] /P [Wi|S = 1],
so that
Li = L
x
i · Pi.(25)
3.5.3. The Markov chain and the martingale. Another useful
observation is that {Bxi }i∈N is not only a martingale, but also a Markov
chain. We denote this Markov chain on [0, 1] by M. To see this, note
that conditioned on S, the private likelihood ratio Pi is independent
of Bxj , j < i, and so its distribution conditioned on B
x
i = P [S = 1|Hxi ]
is the same as its distribution conditioned on (Bx0 , . . . , B
x
i ), which are
σ(Hxi )-measurable.
3.5.4. Information cascades, convergence and learning. An
information cascade is the event that, for some i, conditioned on Hxi , Ai
is independent of Wi. That is, an information cascade is the event that
the observer at infinity knows, at time i, which action agent i is going
to take, even though it only knows the actions of i’s predecessors and
does not know i’s private signal. Equivalently, an information cascade
occurs when Ai is σ(H
x
i )-measurable. It is easy to see that it follows
that Aj will also be σ(H
x
i )-measurable, for all j ≥ i.
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Claim 3.5.2. An information cascade is the event that Bxi is a fixed
point of M.
Proof. If Ai is σ(H
x
i ) measurable then σ(H
x
i ) = σ(H
x
i , Ai) =
σ(Hxi+1). It follows that
Bxi = P [S = 1|Hxi ] = P
[
S = 1
∣∣Hxi+1] = Bxi+1.
Conversely, if Bxi = B
x
i+1 w.p. one, then A
x
i = A
x
i+1 with probability
one, and it follows that Ai = A
x
i+1 is σ(H
x
i )-measurable. 
Theorem 3.5.3. The limit limiAi exists almost surely.
Proof. As noted above, Ai = A
x
i+1. Assume by contradiction that
Axi+1 takes both values infinitely often. Since A
x
i = 1(B
x
i ≥ 12), and
since Bxi converges to B
x
∞, it follows that B
x
∞ =
1
2
.
Note that by the Markov chain nature of {Bxi },
Bxi+1 = f(B
x
i , Ai)(26)
for f : [0, 1]× {0, 1} → [0, 1] independent of i and given by
f(b, a) = E [Bi|Bxi = b, Ai = a] .
Since Ai = 1(Bi ≥ 12), it follows that Bi = |Bi − 12 |(2Ai − 1) + 12 , and
so
f(b, a) = E
[∣∣Bi − 12 ∣∣∣∣Bxi = b, Ai = a] (2a− 1) + 1/2.
Hence f is continuous at (1/2, 1) and (1/2, 0), even if Bi =
1
2
with
positive probability. It follows by taking the limit of Eq. 26 that if
limiB
x
i = 1/2 then f(1/2, 1) = f(1/2, 0). But then B
x
i would equal
f(1/2, ·) for all i, since Bx0 = 1/2, and Axi = 1 for all i, which is a
contradiction. 
Since limiAi exists almost surely we can define
A = lim
i
Ai.
Since Ai 6= A for only a finite number of agents, we can directly apply
Theorem 3.4.4 to arrive at the following result.
Theorem 3.5.4. When private signals are unbounded then A = S
w.p. one.
When private signals are bounded then information cascades occur
with probability one, and A is no longer almost surely equal to S.
Theorem 3.5.5. When private signals are bounded then P [A = S] <
1.
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Proof. When private signals are bounded then the convex closure
of the support of Pi is equal to [,M ] for some ,M > 0. It follows
then from Eq. 25 that if Lxi ≤ 1/M then a.s. Li ≤ 1, and so Ai = 1.
Likewise, if Lxi > 1/ then a.s. Ai = 0. Hence [0, 1/M ] and (1/,∞)
are all fixed points of M.
Note that P [Axi = S|Hxi ] = max{Bxi , 1−Bxi }. Hence we can prove
the claim by showing that Bx∞ = limiB
x
i is in (0, 1), since then it would
follow that limi P [Axi = S] < 1, and in particular P [limiAi = S] < 1.
Indeed, condition on S = 1, and assume by contradiction that
limiB
x
i = 1. Then L
x
i will equal some δ ∈ (0, 1/M) for i large enough.
But δ is a fixed point of M, and so Lxj will equal δ hence and Bxi will
not converge to one. The same argument applies if we condition on
S = 0 and argue that Lxi will equal some N ∈ (1/,∞) for i large
enough. 
3.6. Learning from discrete actions
This section is adapted from Mossel, Sly and Tamuz [31].
We consider agents who maximize, at each time t, the utility func-
tion (Eq. 11)
U it = 1(A
i
t = S).
Hence they choose actions (Eq. 14)
Ait = argmaxs∈{0,1} P
[
S = s
∣∣H it] .
We assume that the social network is undirected, and consider
both the finite and the infinite case.
We ask the following questions:
(1) Agreement. Do the agents reach agreement? In this model
we say that i and j agree if Ai∞ = A
j
∞. We show that this
happens under a weak condition on the private signals.
(2) Learning. When the agents do agree on some limit action
A∞, does this action equal S? We show that the answer to
this question depends on the graph, and that for undirected
graphs indeed A∞ = S with high probability (for large finite
graphs) or with probability one (for infinite graphs).
The condition on private signal that implies agreement on limit
actions is the following. By the definition of beliefs, Bi0 = P [S = 1|Wi].
We say that the private signals induce non-atomic beliefs when the
distribution of Bi0 is non-atomic.
The rational behind this definition is that it precludes the possibility
of indifference or ties. As we show below, indifference is the only cause
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of disagreement, in the sense that agreement follows once indifference
is done away with.
3.6.1. Main results. In our first theorem we show that when ini-
tial private beliefs are non-atomic, then at the limit t → ∞ the limit
action sets of the players are identical.
Theorem 3.6.1 (Mossel, Sly and Tamuz). Let (µ0, µ1) induce non-
atomic beliefs. Then there exists a random variable A∞ such that al-
most surely Ai∞ = A∞ for all i.
I.e., when initial private beliefs are non-atomic then agents, at the
limit, agree on the optimal action. The following theorem states that
when such agreement is guaranteed then the agents learn the state of
the world with high probability, when the number of agents is large.
This phenomenon is known as asymptotic learning. This theorem is
our main result.
Theorem 3.6.2 (Mossel, Sly and Tamuz). Let µ0, µ1 be such that
for every connected, undirected graph G there exists a random variable
A∞ such that almost surely Ai∞ = A∞ for all u ∈ V . Then there exists
a sequence q(n) = q(n, µ0, µ1) such that q(n) → 1 as n → ∞, and
P [A∞ = S] ≥ q(n), for any choice of undirected, connected graph G
with n agents.
Informally, when agents agree on limit action sets then they nec-
essarily learn the correct state of the world, with probability that ap-
proaches one as the number of agents grows. This holds uniformly over
all possible connected and undirected social network graphs.
The following theorem is a direct consequence of the two theorems
above, since the property proved by Theorem 3.6.1 is the condition
required by Theorem 3.6.2.
Theorem 3.6.3. Let µ0 and µ1 induce non-atomic beliefs. Then
there exists a sequence q(n) = q(n, µ0, µ1) such that q(n) → 1 as n →
∞, and P [Ai∞ = S] ≥ q(n), for all agents i and for any choice of
undirected, connected G with n agents.
Before delving into the proofs of Theorems 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 we intro-
duce additional definitions in subsection 3.6.2 and prove some general
lemmas in subsections 3.6.3, 3.6.4 and 3.6.5. Note that Lemma 3.6.6,
which is the main technical insight in the proof of Theorem 3.6.2, may
be of independent interest. We prove Theorem 3.6.2 in subsection 3.6.6
and Theorem 3.6.1 in subsection 3.6.7.
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3.6.2. Additional general notation. We denote the log-likelihood
ratio of agent i’s belief at time t by
Zit = log
Bit
1−Bit
,
and let
Zi∞ = lim
t→∞
Zit .
Note that
Zit = log
P [S = 1|H it ]
P [S = 0|H it ]
.
and that
Zi0 = log
dµ1
dµ0
(Wi).
Note also that Zit converges almost surely since B
i
t does.
We denote the set of actions of agent i up to time t by
Ai[0,t) = (A
i
0, . . . , A
i
t−1).
The set of all actions of i is similarly denoted by
Ai[0,∞) = (A
i
0, A
i
1, . . .).
We denote the actions of the neighbors of i up to time t by
I it = {Aj[0,t) : j ∈ ∂i} = {Ajt′ : j ∈ ∂i, t′ < t},
and let Ii denote all the actions of i’s neighbors:
I i∞ = {Aj[0,∞) : j ∈ ∂i} = {Ajt′ : j ∈ ∂i, t′ geq0}.
Note that using this notation we have that H it = {Wi, I it} and F i∞ =
{Wi, Ii}.
We denote the probability that i chooses the correct action at time
t by
pit = P
[
Ait = S
]
.
and accordingly
pi∞ = lim
t→∞
pit.
For a set of vertices U ⊆ V we denote by W (U) the private signals
of the agents in U .
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3.6.3. Sequences of rooted graphs and their limits. In this
section we define a topology on rooted graphs. We call convergence in
this topology convergence to local limits, and use it repeatedly in the
proof of Theorem 3.6.2. The core of the proof of Theorem 3.6.2 is the
topological Lemma 3.6.6, which we prove here. This lemma is a claim
related to local graph properties, which we also introduce here.
Let G = (V,E) be a finite or countably infinite graph, and let
i ∈ V be a vertex in G such that for every vertex j ∈ V there exists
a (directed) path in G from i to j. We denote by (G, i) the rooted
graph G with root i.
Note that the requirement that there exist paths from the root to
all other vertices is non-standard in the definition of rooted graphs.
However, we will eventually only consider strongly connected graphs,
and so this will always hold.
Let G = (V,E) and G′ = (V ′, E ′) be graphs. h : V → V ′ is a graph
isomorphism between G and G′ if (i, j) ∈ E ⇔ (h(i), h(j)) ∈ E ′.
Let (G, i) and (G′, i′) be rooted graphs. Then h : V → V ′ is
a rooted graph isomorphism between (G, i) and (G′, i′) if h is a
graph isomorphism and h(u) = u′.
We write (G, i) ∼= (G′, i′) whenever there exists a rooted graph
isomorphism between the two rooted graphs.
Given a (perhaps directed) graph G = (V,E) and two vertices i, j ∈
V , the graph distance d(i, j) is equal to the length in edges of a shortest
(directed) path between i and j. We denote by Br(G, i) the ball of
radius r around the vertex i in the graph G = (V,E): Let V ′ be the
set of vertices j such that d(i, j) is at most r. Let E ′ = {(i, j) ∈ E :
i, j ∈ V ′}. Then Br(G, i) is the rooted graph with vertices V ′, edges
E ′ and root i′.
Note that the requirement that rooted graphs have paths from the
root to all other vertices is equivalent to having B∞(G, i) ∼= (G, i).
We next define a topology on strongly connected rooted graphs
(or rather on their isomorphism classes; we shall simply refer to these
classes as graphs). A natural metric between strongly connected rooted
graphs is the following (see Benjamini and Schramm [6], Aldous and
Steele [1]). Given (G, i) and (G′, i′), let
D((G, i), (G′, i′)) = 2−R,
where
R = sup{r : Br(G, i) ∼= Br(G′, i′)}.
This is indeed a metric: the triangle inequality follows immediately,
and a standard diagonalization argument is needed to show that if
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D((G, i), (G′, i′)) = 0 then B∞(G, i) ∼= B∞(G′, i′) and so (G, i) ∼=
(G′, i′).
This metric induces a topology that will be useful to us. As usual,
the basis of this topology is the set of balls of the metric; the ball of
radius 2−R around the graph (G, i) is the set of graphs (G′, i′) such
that BR(G, i) ∼= BR(G′, i′). We refer to convergence in this topology
as convergence to a local limit, and provide the following equivalent
definition for it.
Let {(Gr, ir)}∞r=1 be a sequence of strongly connected rooted graphs.
We say that the sequence converges if there exists a strongly connected
rooted graph (G′, i′) such that
Br(G
′, i′) ∼= Br(Gr, ir),
for all r ≥ 1. We then write
(G′, i′) = lim
r→∞
(Gr, ir),
and call (G′, i′) the local limit of the sequence {(Gr, ir)}∞r=1.
Let Gd be the set of strongly connected rooted graphs with degree
at most d. Another standard diagonalization argument shows that Gd
is compact (see again [6, 1]). Then, since the space is metric, every
sequence in Gd has a converging subsequence:
Lemma 3.6.4. Let {(Gr, ir)}∞r=1 be a sequence of rooted graphs in
Gd. Then there exists a subsequence {(Gri , irn)}∞n=1 with rn+1 > rn for
all n, such that limn→∞(Grn , urn) exists.
We next define local properties of rooted graphs. Let P be property
of rooted graphs or a Boolean predicate on rooted graphs. We write
(G, i) ∈ P if (G, i) has the property, and (G, i) /∈ P otherwise.
We say that P is a local property if, for every (G, i) ∈ P there
exists an r > 0 such that if Br(G, i) ∼= Br(G′, i′), then (G′, i′) ∈ P .
Let r be such that Br(G, i) ∼= Br(G′, i′) ⇒ (G′, i′) ∈ P . Then we say
that (G, i) has property P with radius r, and denote (G, i) ∈ P (r).
That is, if (G, i) has a local property P then there is some r such that
knowing the ball of radius r around i in G is sufficient to decide that
(G, i) has the property P .
An alternative name for a local property would therefore be a locally
decidable property. In our topology, local properties are nothing but
open sets: the definition above states that if (G, i) ∈ P then there
exists an element of the basis of the topology that includes (G, i) and
is also in P . This is a necessary and sufficient condition for P to be
open.
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We use this fact to prove the following lemma. Let Bd be the set of
infinite, connected, undirected graphs of degree at most d, and let Brd
be the set of Bd-rooted graphs
Brd = {(G, i) : G ∈ Bd, i ∈ G}.
Lemma 3.6.5. Brd is compact.
Proof. Lemma 3.6.4 states that Gd, the set of strongly connected
rooted graphs of degree at most d, is compact. Since Brd is a subset of
Gd, it remains to show that Brd is closed in Gd.
The complement of Brd in Gd is the set of graphs in Gd that are either
finite or directed. These are both local properties: if (G, i) is finite (or
directed), then there exists a radius r such that examining Br(G, i) is
enough to determine that it is finite (or directed). Hence the sets of
finite graphs and directed graphs in Gd are open in Gd, their intersection
is open in Gd, and their complement, Brd, is closed in Gd. 
We now state and prove the main lemma of this subsection. Note
that the set of graphs Bd satisfies the conditions of this lemma.
Lemma 3.6.6. Let A be a set of infinite, strongly connected graphs,
let Ar be the set of A-rooted graphs
Ar = {(G, i) : G ∈ A, i ∈ G},
and assume that A is such that Ar is compact.
Let P be a local property such that for each G ∈ A there exists a
vertex j ∈ G such that (G, j) ∈ P . Then for each G ∈ A there exist an
r0 and infinitely many distinct vertices {jn}∞n=1 such that (G, jn) ∈ P (r0)
for all n.
Proof. Let G be an arbitrary graph in A. Consider a sequence
{kr}∞r=1 of vertices in G such that for all r, s ∈ N the balls Br(G, kr)
and Bs(G, ks) are disjoint.
Since Ar is compact, the sequence {(G, kr)}∞r=1 has a converging
subsequence {(G, krn)}∞n=1 with rn+1 > rn. Write ir = krn , and let
(G′, i′) = lim
r→∞
(G, ir).
Note that since Ar is compact, (G′, i′) ∈ Ar and in particular G′ ∈ A is
an infinite, strongly connected graph. Note also that since rn+1 > rn,
it also holds that the balls Br(G, ir) and Bs(G, is) are disjoint for all
r, s ∈ N.
Since G′ ∈ A, there exists a vertex j′ ∈ G′ such that (G′, j′) ∈ P .
Since P is a local property, (G′, j′) ∈ P (r0) for some r0, so that if
Br0(G
′, j′) ∼= Br0(G, j) then (G, j) ∈ P .
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local limit
Figure 1. Schematic diagram of the proof of
lemma 3.6.6. The rooted graph (G′, i′) is a local limit
of (G, ir). For r ≥ R, the ball BR(G′, i′) is isomorphic to
the ball BR(G, ir), with w
′ ∈ G′ corresponding to jr ∈ G.
Let R = d(i′, j′) + r0, so that Br0(G
′, j′) ⊆ BR(G′, i′). Then, since
the sequence (G, ir) converges to (G
′, i′), for all r ≥ R it holds that
BR(G, ir) ∼= BR(G′, i′). Therefore, for all r > R there exists a vertex
jr ∈ BR(G, jr) such that Br0(G, jr) ∼= Br0(G′, j′). Hence (G, jr) ∈ P (r0)
for all r > R (see Fig 1). Furthermore, for r, s > R, the balls BR(G, ir)
and BR(G, is) are disjoint, and so jr 6= js.
We have therefore shown that the vertices {jr}r>R are an infinite
set of distinct vertices such that (G, jr) ∈ P (r0), as required.

3.6.4. Coupling isomorphic balls. This section includes three
claims that we will use repeatedly later. Their spirit is that everything
that happens to an agent up to time t depends only on the state of the
world and a ball of radius t around it.
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Recall that H it , the information available to agent i at time t, in-
cludes Wi and A
j
t′ for all j neighbors of i and t
′ < t. Recall that I it
denotes this exact set of actions:
I it = {Aj[0,t) : j ∈ ∂i} = {Ajt′ : j ∈ ∂i, t′ < t}.
Claim 3.6.7. For all agents i and times t, I it a deterministic func-
tion of W (Bt(G, i)).
Recall that W (Bt(G, i)) are the private signals of the agents in
Bt(G, i), the ball of radius t around i.
Proof. We prove by induction on t. I i0 is empty, and so the claim
holds for t = 1.
Assume the claim holds up to time t. By definition, Ait+1 is a
function of Wi and of I
i
t+1, which includes {Ajt′ : w ∈ ∂i, t′ ≤ t}. Ajt′
is a function of Wj and I
j
t′ , and hence by the inductive assumption
it is a function of W (Bt′(G,w)). Since t
′ < t + 1 and the distance
between i and j is one, W (Bt′(G, j)) ⊆ W (Bt+1(G, i)), for all j ∈ ∂i
and t′ ≤ t . Hence I it+1 is a function of W (Bt+1(G, i)), the private
signals in Bt+1(G, i). 
The following lemma follows from Claim 3.6.7 above:
Lemma 3.6.8. Consider two processes with identical private signal
distributions (µ0, µ1), on different graphs G = (V,E) and G
′ = (V ′, E ′).
Let t ≥ 1, i ∈ V and i′ ∈ V ′ be such that there exists a rooted graph
isomorphism h : Bt(G, i)→ Bt(G′, i′).
Let M be a random variable that is measurable in σ(H it). Then
there exists an M ′ that is measurable in H i
′
t such that the distribution
of (M,S) is identical to the distribution of (M ′, S ′).
Recall that a graph isomorphism between G = (V,E) and G′ =
(V ′, E ′) is a bijective function h : V → V such that (u, v) ∈ E iff
(h(u), h(v)) ∈ E ′.
Proof. Couple the two processes by setting S = S ′, and letting
Wj = Wj′ when h(j) = j
′. Note that it follows that Wi = Wi′ . By
Claim 3.6.7 we have that I it = I
i′
t , when using h to identify vertices in
V with vertices in V ′.
Since M is measurable in σ(H it), it must, by the definition of H
i
t , be
a function of I it and Wi. Denote then M = f(I
i
t ,Wi). Since we showed
that I it = I
i′
t , if we let M
′ = f(I i
′
t ,Wi′) then the distribution of (M,S)
and (M ′, S ′) will be identical. 
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In particular, we use this lemma in the case where M is an estimator
of S. Then this lemma implies that the probability that M = S is equal
to the probability that M ′ = S ′.
Recall that pit = P [Ait = S] = maxA∈σ(Hit) P [A = S]. Hence we can
apply this lemma (3.6.8) above to Ait and A
i′
t :
Corollary 3.6.9. If Bt(G, i) and Bt(G
′, i′) are isomorphic then
pit = pi′(t).
3.6.5. δ-independence. To prove that agents learn S we will
show that the agents must, over the duration of this process, gain
access to a large number of measurements of S that are almost inde-
pendent. To formalize the notion of almost-independence we define
δ-independence and prove some easy results about it. The proofs in
this subsection are relatively straightforward.
Let µ and ν be two measures defined on the same space. We de-
note the total variation distance between them by dTV ((, µ) , ν). Let
A and B be two random variables with joint distribution µ(A,B). Then
we denote by µA the marginal distribution of A, µB the marginal dis-
tribution of B, and µA × µB the product distribution of the marginal
distributions.
Let (X1, X2, . . . , Xk) be random variables. We refer to them as δ-
independent if their joint distribution µ(X1,...,Xk) has total variation
distance of at most δ from the product of their marginal distributions
µX1 × · · · × µXk :
dTV ((, µ)(X1,...,Xk) , µX1 × · · · × µXk) ≤ δ.
Likewise, (X1, . . . , Xl) are δ-dependent if the distance between the
distributions is more than δ.
We remind the reader that a coupling ν, between two random vari-
ables A1 and A2 distributed ν1 and ν2, is a distribution on the product
of the spaces ν1, ν2 such that the marginal of Ai is νi. The total vari-
ation distance between A1 and A2 is equal to the minimum, over all
such couplings ν, of ν(A1 6= A2).
Hence to prove that X, Y are δ-independent it is sufficient to show
that there exists a coupling ν between ν1, the joint distribution of
(X, Y ) and ν2, the products of the marginal distributions of X and Y ,
such that ν((X1, Y1) 6= (X2, Y2)) ≤ δ.
Alternatively, to prove that (A,B) are δ-independent, one could di-
rectly bound the total variation distance between µ(A,B) and µA×µB by
δ. This is often done below using the fact that the total variation dis-
tance satisfies the triangle inequality dTV ((, µ) , ν) ≤ dTV ((, µ) , γ) +
dTV ((, γ) , ν).
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We state and prove some straightforward claims regarding δ-independence.
Claim 3.6.10. Let A, B and C be random variables such that
P [A 6= B] ≤ δ and (B,C) are δ′-independent. Then (A,C) are 2δ+ δ′-
independent.
Proof. Let µ(A,B,C) be a joint distribution of A, B and C such
that P [A 6= B] ≤ δ.
Since P [A 6= B] ≤ δ, P [(A,C) 6= (B,C)] ≤ δ, in both cases that
A,B,C are picked from either µ(A,B,C) or µ(A,B) × µC . Hence
dTV ((, µ)(A,C) , µ(B,C)) ≤ δ
and
dTV ((, µ)A × µC , µB × µC) ≤ δ.
Since (B,C) are δ′-independent,
dTV ((, µ)B × µC , µ(B,C)) ≤ δ′.
The claim follows from the triangle inequality
dTV ((, µ)(A,C) , µA × µC)
≤ dTV ((, µ)(A,C) , µ(B,C)) + dTV ((, µ)(B,C) , µB × µC) + dTV ((, µ)B × µC , µA × µC)
≤ 2δ + δ′.

Claim 3.6.11. Let (X, Y ) be δ-independent, and let Z = f(Y,B)
for some function f and B that is independent of both X and Y . Then
(X,Z) are also δ-independent.
Proof. Let µ(X,Y ) be a joint distribution of X and Y satisfying
the conditions of the claim. Then since (X, Y ) are δ-independent,
dTV ((, µ)(X,Y ) , µX × µY ) ≤ δ.
Since B is independent of both X and Y ,
dTV ((, µ)(X,Y ) × µB, µX × µY × µB) ≤ δ
and (X, Y,B) are δ-independent. Therefore there exists a coupling
between (X1, Y1, B1) ∼ µ(X,Y ) × µB and (X2, Y2, B2) ∼ µX × µY × µB
such that P [(X1, Y1, B1) 6= (X2, Y2, B2)] ≤ δ. Then
P [(X1, f(Y1, B1)) 6= (X2, f(Y2, B2))] ≤ δ
and the proof follows. 
Claim 3.6.12. Let A = (A1, . . . , Ak), and X be random variables.
Let (A1, . . . , Ak) be δ1-independent and let (A,X) be δ2-independent.
Then (A1, . . . , Ak, X) are (δ1 + δ2)-independent.
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Proof. Let µ(A1,...,Ak,X) be the joint distribution ofA = (A1, . . . , Ak)
and X. Then since (A1, . . . , Ak) are δ1-independent,
dTV ((, µ)A , µA1 × · · · × µAk) ≤ δ1.
Hence
dTV ((, µ)A × µX , µA1 × · · · × µAk × µX) ≤ δ1.
Since (A,X) are δ2-independent,
dTV ((, µ)(A,X) , µA × µX) ≤ δ2.
The claim then follows from the triangle inequality
dTV ((, µ)(A,X) , µA1 × · · · × µAk × µX)
≤ dTV ((, µ)(A,X) , µA × µX) + dTV ((, µ)A × µX , µA1 × · · · × µAk × µX).

Lemma 3.6.13. For every 1/2 < p < 1 there exist δ = δ(p) > 0
and η = η(p) > 0 such that if S and (X1, X2, X3) are binary ran-
dom variables with P [S = 1] = 1/2, 1/2 < p−η ≤ P [Xi = S] < 1, and
(X1, X2, X3) are δ-independent conditioned on S then P [a(X1, X2, X3) = S] >
p, where a is the MAP estimator of S given (X1, X2, X3).
In other words, one’s odds of guessing S using three conditionally
almost-independent bits are greater than using a single bit.
Proof. We apply Lemma 3.6.14 below to three conditionally in-
dependent bits which are each equal to S w.p. at least p− η. Then
P [a(X1, X2, X3) = S] ≥ p− η + p−η
where q =
1
100
(2q − 1)(3q2 − 2q3 − q).
Since q is continuous in q and positive for 1/2 < q < 1, it follows
that for η small enough p − η + p−η > p. Now, take δ < p−η − η.
Then, since we can couple δ-independent bits to independent bits so
that they differ with probability at most δ, the claim follows. 
Lemma 3.6.14. Let S and (X1, X2, X3) be binary random variables
such that P [S = 1] = 1/2. Let 1/2 < p ≤ P [Xi = S] < 1. Let
a(X1, X2, X3) be the MAP estimator of S given (X1, X2, X3). Then
there exists an p > 0 that depends only on p such that if (X1, X2, X3)
are independent conditioned on S then P [a(X1, X2, X3) = S] ≥ p+ p.
In particular the statement holds with
p =
1
100
(2p− 1)(3p2 − 2p3 − p).
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Proof. Denote X = (X1, X2, X3).
Assume first that P [Xi = S] = p for all i. Let δ1, δ2, δ3 be such that
p+ δi = P [Xi = 1|S = 1] and p− δi = P [Xi = 0|S = 0].
To show that P [a(X) = S] ≥ p + p it is enough to show that
P [b(X) = S] ≥ p+ p for some estimator b, by the definition of a MAP
estimator. We separate into three cases.
(1) If δ1 = δ2 = δ3 = 0 then the events Xi = S are independent
and the majority of the Xi’s is equal to S with probability
p′ = p3 + 3p2(1 − p), which is greater than p for 1
2
< p < 1.
Denote ηp = p
′ − p. Then P [a(X) = S] ≥ p+ ηp.
(2) Otherwise if |δi| ≤ ηp/6 for all i then we can couple X to
three bits Y = (Y1, Y2, Y3) which satisfy the conditions of case
1 above, and so that P [X 6= Y ] ≤ ηp/2. Then P [a(X) = S] ≥
p+ ηp/2.
(3) Otherwise we claim that there exist i and j such that |δi+δj| >
ηp/12.
Indeed assume w.l.o.g. that δ1 ≥ ηp/6. Then if it doesn’t
hold that δ1 + δ2 ≥ ηp/12 and it doesn’t hold that δ1 + δ3 ≥
ηp/12 then δ2 ≤ −ηp/12 and δ3 ≤ −ηp/12 and therefore δ2 +
δ3 ≤ −ηp/12.
Now that this claim is proved, assume w.l.o.g. that δ1+δ2 ≥
ηp/12. Recall that Xi ∈ {0, 1}, and so the product X1X2 is
also an element of {0, 1}. Then
P [X1X2 = S] = 12P [X1X2 = 1|S = 1] + 12P [X1X2 = 0|S = 0]
= 1
2
(
(p+ δ1)(p+ δ2)
+ (p− δ1)(p− δ2) + (p− δ1)(1− p+ δ2) + (1− p+ δ1)(p− δ2)
)
= p+ 1
2
(2p− 1)(δ1 + δ2)
≥ p+ (2p− 1)ηp/12,
and so P [a(X) = S] ≥ p+ (2p− 1)ηp/12.
Finally, we need to consider the case that P [Xi = S] = pi∞ > p for
some i. We again consider two cases. Denote p = (2p − 1)ηp/100. If
there exists an i such that pi∞ > p then this bit is by itself an estimator
that equals S with probability at least p + p, and therefore the MAP
estimator equals S with probability at least p+ p.
Otherwise p ≤ pi∞ ≤ pi∞ + p for all i. We will construct a
coupling between the distributions of X = (X1, X2, X3) and Y =
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(Y1, Y2, Y3) such that the Yi’s are conditionally independent given S
and P [Yi = S] = p for all i, and furthermore P [Y 6= X] ≤ 3p. By
what we’ve proved so far the MAP estimator of S given Y equals S
with probability at least p+(2p−1)ηp/12 ≥ p+8p. Hence by the cou-
pling, the same estimator applied to X is equal to S with probability
at least p+ 8p − 3p > p+ p.
To couple X and Y let Zi be a real i.i.d. random variables uniform
on [0, 1]. When S = 1 let Xi = Yi = S if Zi > p
i
∞ + δi, let Xi = S and
Yi = 1−S if Zi ∈ [p+ δi, pi∞+ δi], and otherwise Xi = Yi = 1−S. The
construction for S = 0 is similar. It is clear that X and Y have the
required distribution, and that furthermore P [Xi 6= Yi] = pi∞− p ≤ p.
Hence P [X 6= Y ] ≤ 3p, as needed.

3.6.6. Asymptotic learning. In this section we prove Theorem 3.6.2.
Theorem (3.6.2). Let µ0, µ1 be such that for every connected, undi-
rected graph G there exists a random variable A∞ such that almost
surely Ai∞ = A∞ for all i ∈ V . Then there exists a sequence q(n) =
q(n, µ0, µ1) such that q(n)→ 1 as n→∞, and P [A∞ = S] ≥ q(n), for
any choice of undirected, connected graph G with n agents.
To prove this theorem we will need a number of intermediate results,
which are given over the next few subsections.
3.6.6.1. Estimating the limiting optimal action set A∞. We would
like to show that although the agents have a common optimal action
set A∞ only at the limit t → ∞, they can estimate this set well at a
large enough time t.
The action Ait is agent i’s MAP estimator of S at time t. We likewise
define Kit to be agent i’s MAP estimator of A∞, at time t:
Kit = argmaxK∈0,1,{0,1}} P
[
A∞ = K
∣∣H it] .(27)
We show that the sequence of random variables Kit converges to A∞
for every i, or that alternatively Kit = A∞ for each agent i and t large
enough:
Lemma 3.6.15. P [limt→∞Kit = A∞] = 1 for all i ∈ V .
This lemma (3.6.15) follows by direct application of the more gen-
eral Lemma 3.6.16 which we prove below. Note that a consequence is
that limt→∞ P [Kit = A∞] = 1.
Lemma 3.6.16. Let K1 ⊆ K2, . . . be a filtration of σ-algebras, and let
K∞ = ∪tKt. Let K be a random variable that takes a finite number of
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values and is measurable in K∞. Let M(t) = argmaxk P [K = k|K(t)]
be the MAP estimator of K given Kt. Then
P
[
lim
t→∞
M(t) = K
]
= 1.
Proof. For each k in the support of K, P [K = k|Kt] is a bounded
martingale which converges almost surely to P [K = k|K∞], which is
equal to 1(K = k), since K is measurable in G∞. Therefore M(t) =
argmaxk P [K = k|Kt] converges almost surely to argmaxk P [K = k|K∞] =
K. 
We would like at this point to provide the reader with some more
intuition on Ait, K
i
t and the difference between them. Assuming that
A∞ = 1 then by definition, from some time t0 on, Ait = 1, and from
Lemma 3.6.15, Kit = 1. The same applies when A∞ = 0. However,
when A∞ = {0, 1} then Ait takes both values 0 and 1 infinitely often,
but Kit will eventually equal {0, 1}. That is, agent i will realize at some
point that, although it thinks at the moment that 1 is preferable to 0
(for example), it is in fact the most likely outcome that its belief will
converge to 1/2. In this case, although it is not optimal, a uniformly
random guess of which is the best action may not be so bad. Our next
definition is based on this observation.
Based on Kit , we define a second “action” C
i
t . Let C
i
t be picked
uniformly from Kit : if K
i
t = 1 then C
i
t = 1, if K
i
t = 0 then C
i
t = 0,
and if Kit = {0, 1} then Cit is picked independently from the uniform
distribution over {0, 1}.
Note that we here extend our probability space by including in I it
(the observations of agent i up to time t) an extra uniform bit that is
independent of all else and S in particular. Hence this does not increase
i’s ability to estimate S, and if we can show that in this setting i learns
S then i can also learn S without this bit. In fact, we show that
asymptotically it is as good an estimate for S as the best estimate Ait:
Claim 3.6.17. limt→∞ P [Cit = S] = limt→∞ P [Ait = S] = p for all
i.
Proof. We prove the claim by showing that it holds both when
conditioning on the event A∞ = {0, 1} and when conditioning on its
complement.
When A∞ 6= {0, 1} then for t large enough A∞ = {Ait}. Since (by
Lemma 3.6.15) limKit = A∞ with probability 1, in this case C
i
t = A
i
t
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for t large enough, and
lim
t→∞
P
[
Cit = S
∣∣A∞ 6= {0, 1}] = P [A∞ = S|A∞ 6= {0, 1}]
= lim
t→∞
P
[
Ait = S
∣∣A∞ 6= {0, 1}] .
When A∞ = {0, 1} then limBit = limP [Ait = S|H it ] = 1/2 and so
limP [Ait = S] = 1/2. This is again also true for Cit , since in this case
it is picked at random for t large enough, and so
lim
t→∞
P
[
Cit = S
∣∣A∞ = {0, 1}] = 1
2
= lim
t→∞
P
[
Ait = S
∣∣A∞ = {0, 1}] .

3.6.6.2. The probability of getting it right. Recall that pit = P [Ait = S]
and pi∞ = limt→∞ p
i
t (i.e., p
i
t is the probability that agent i takes the
right action at time t). We state here a few easy related claims that
will later be useful to us. The next claim is a rephrasing of the first
part of Claim 3.1.2.
Claim 3.6.18. pit+1 ≥ pit.
The following claim is a rephrasing of Corollary 3.1.3.
Claim 3.6.19. There exists a p ∈ [0, 1] such that pi∞ = p for all i.
We make the following definition in the spirit of these claims:
p = lim
t→∞
P
[
Ait = S
]
.
In the context of a specific social network graph G we may denote this
quantity as p(G).
For time t = 1 the next standard claim follows from the fact that
the agents’ signals are informative.
Claim 3.6.20. pit > 1/2 for all i and t.
Proof. Note that
P
[
Ai0 = S
∣∣Wi] = max{Bi0, 1−Bi0} = max{P [S = 0|Wi] ,P [S = 1|Wi]}.
Recall that pi0 = P [Ai0 = S]. Hence
pi0 = E
[
P
[
Ai0 = S
∣∣Wi]]
= E [max{P [S = 0|Wi] ,P [S = 1|Wi]}]
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Since max{a, b} = 1
2
(a+b)+1
2
|a−b|, and since P [S = 0|Wi]+P [S = 1|Wi] =
1, it follows that
pi∞(1) =
1
2
+ 1
2
E [|P [S = 0|Wi]− P [S = 1|Wi] |]
= 1
2
+ 1
2
DTV (µ0, µ1),
where the last equality follows by Bayes’ rule. Since µ0 6= µ1, the total
variation distance DTV (µ0, µ1) > 0 and p
i
0 >
1
2
. For t > 1 the claim
follows from Claim 3.6.18 above. 
Recall that |∂i| is the out-degree of i, or the number of neighbors
that i observes. The next lemma states that an agent with many
neighbors will have a good estimate of S already at the second round,
after observing the first action of its neighbors.
Lemma 3.6.21. There exist constants C1 = C1(µ0, µ1) and C2 =
C2(µ0, µ1) such that for any agent i it holds that
pi1 ≥ 1− C1e−C2·|∂i|.
Proof. Conditioned on S, private signals are independent and
identically distributed. Since Aj0 is a deterministic function of Wj,
the initial actions Aj0 are also identically distributed, conditioned on S.
Hence there exists a q such that pj0 = P
[
Ajt = S
]
= q for all agents j.
By Lemma 3.6.20 above, q > 1/2. Therefore
P
[
Aj0 = 1
∣∣S = 1] 6= P [Aj0 = 1∣∣S = 0] ,
and the distribution of Aj0 is different when conditioned on S = 0 or
S = 1.
Fix an agent i, and let n = |∂i| be the out-degree of i, or the
number of neighbors that it observes. Let {j1, . . . , j|∂i|} be the set
of i’s neighbors. Recall that Ai1 is the MAP estimator of S given
(Aj10 , . . . , A
jn
0 ), and given i’s private signal.
By standard asymptotic statistics of hypothesis testing (cf. [12]),
testing an hypothesis (in our case, say, S = 1 vs. S = 0) given n in-
formative, conditionally i.i.d. signals, succeeds except with probability
that is exponentially low in n. It follows that P [Ai1 6= S] is exponen-
tially small in n, so that there exist C1 and C2 such that
pi1 = P
[
Ai1 = S
] ≥ 1− C1e−C2·∂i.

The following claim is a direct consequence of the previous lemmas
of this section.
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Claim 3.6.22. Let d(G) = sup{|∂i|} be the out-degree of the graph
G; note that for infinite graphs it may be that d(G) = ∞. Then there
exist constants C1 = C1(µ0, µ1) and C2 = C2(µ0, µ1) such that
p(G) ≥ 1− C1e−C2·d(G)
for all agents i.
Proof. Let i be an arbitrary vertex in G. Then by Lemma 3.6.21
it holds that
pi1 ≥ 1− C1e−C2·∂i,
for some constants C1 and C2. By Lemma 3.6.18 we have that p
i
t+1 ≥ pit,
and therefore
pi∞ = lim
n→∞
pit ≥ 1− C1e−C2·∂i.
Finally, p(G) = pi∞ by Lemma 3.6.19, and so
pi∞ ≥ 1− C1e−C2·∂i.
Since this holds for an arbitrary vertex i, the claim follows. 
3.6.6.3. Local limits and pessimal graphs. We now turn to apply
local limits to our process. We consider here and henceforth the same
model as applied, with the same private signals, to different graphs.
We write p(G) for the value of p on the process on G, A∞(G) for the
value of A∞ on G, etc.
Lemma 3.6.23. Let (G, i) = limr→∞(Gr, ir). Then p(G) ≤ lim infr p(Gr).
Proof. Since Br(Gr, ir) ∼= Br(G, i), by Lemma 3.6.9 we have that
pir = pirr . By Claim 3.6.18 p
ir
r ≤ p(Gr), and therefore pir ≤ p(Gr). The
claim follows by taking the lim inf of both sides. 
A particularly interesting case in the one the different Gr’s are all
the same graph:
Corollary 3.6.24. Let G be a (perhaps infinite) graph, and let
{ir} be a sequence of vertices. Then if the local limit (H, u) = limr→∞(G, ir)
exists then p(H) ≤ p(G).
Recall that Bd denotes the set of infinite, connected, undirected
graphs of degree at most d. Let
B =
⋃
d
Bd.
Let
p∗ = p∗(µ0, µ1) = inf
G∈B
p(G)
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be the probability of learning in the pessimal graph.
Note that by Claim 3.6.20 we have that p∗ > 1/2. We show that
this infimum is in fact attained by some graph:
Lemma 3.6.25. There exists a graph H ∈ B such that p(H) = p∗.
Proof. Let {Gr = (Vr, Er)}∞r=1 be a series of graphs in B such
that limr→∞ p(Gr) = p∗. Note that {Gr} must all be in Bd for some
d (i.e., have uniformly bounded degrees), since otherwise the sequence
p(Gr) would have values arbitrarily close to 1 and its limit could not
be p∗ (unless indeed p∗ = 1, in which case our main Theorem 3.6.2 is
proved). This follows from Lemma 3.6.21.
We now arbitrarily mark a vertex ir in each graph, so that ir ∈ Vr,
and let (H, i) be the limit of some subsequence of {Gr, ir}∞r=1. Since Bd
is compact (Lemma 3.6.5), (H, i) is guaranteed to exist, and H ∈ Bd.
By Lemma 3.6.23 we have that p(H) ≤ lim infr p(Gr) = p∗. But
since H ∈ B, p(H) cannot be less than p∗, and the claim is proved. 
3.6.6.4. Independent bits. We now show that on infinite graphs, the
private signals in the neighborhood of agents that are “far enough
away” are (conditioned on S) almost independent of A∞ (the final
consensus estimate of S).
Lemma 3.6.26. Let G be an infinite graph. Fix a vertex i0 in G.
Then for every δ > 0 there exists an rδ such that for every r ≥ rδ and
every vertex i with d(i0, i) > 2r it holds that W (Br(G, i)), the private
signals in Br(G, i), are δ-independent of A∞, conditioned on S.
Here we denote graph distance by d(·, ·).
Proof. Fix i0, and let i be such that d(i0, u) > 2r. Then Br(G, i0)
and Br(G, i) are disjoint, and hence independent conditioned on S.
Hence Ki0r is independent of W (Br(G, i)), conditioned on S.
Lemma 3.6.15 states that P [limr→∞Ki0r = A∞] = 1, and so there
exists an rδ such that for every r ≥ rδ it holds that P [Ki0r = A∞] >
1− 1
2
δ.
Recall Claim 3.6.10: for any A,B,C, if P [A = B] = 1− 1
2
δ and B
is independent of C, then (A,C) are δ-independent.
Applying Claim 3.6.10 to A∞, Ki0r and W (Br(G, i)) we get that
for any r greater than rδ it holds that W (Br(G, i)) is δ-independent of
A∞, conditioned on S. 
We will now show, in the lemmas below, that in infinite graphs each
agent has access to any number of “good estimators”: δ-independent
measurements of S that are each almost as likely to equal S as p∗, the
minimal probability of estimating S on any infinite graph.
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We say that agent i ∈ G has k (δ, )-good estimators if there
exists a time t and estimators M1, . . . ,Mk such that (M1, . . . ,Mk) ∈ H it
and
(1) P [Mi = S] > p∗ −  for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
(2) (M1, . . . ,Mk) are δ-independent, conditioned on S.
Claim 3.6.27. Let P denote the property of having k (δ, )-good
estimators. Then P is a local property of the rooted graph (G, i). Fur-
thermore, if u ∈ G has k (δ, )-good estimators measurable in H it then
(G, i) ∈ P (t), i.e., (G, i) has property P with radius t.
Proof. If (G, i) ∈ P then by definition there exists a time t such
that (M1, . . . ,Mk) ∈ H it . Hence by Lemma 3.6.8, ifBt(G, i) ∼= Bt(G′, i′)
then i′ ∈ G′ also has k (δ, )-good estimators (M ′1, . . . ,M ′k) ∈ σ(H i′t )
and (G′, i′) ∈ P . In particular, (G, i) ∈ P (t), i.e., (G, i) has property P
with radius t. 
We are now ready to prove the main lemma of this subsection:
Lemma 3.6.28. For every d ≥ 2, G ∈ Bd, , δ > 0 and k ≥ 0 there
exists a vertex i, such that i has k (δ, )-good estimators.
Informally, this lemma states that if G is an infinite graph with
bounded degrees, then there exists an agent that eventually has k
almost-independent estimates of S with quality close to p∗, the minimal
probability of learning.
Proof. In this proof we use the term “independent” to mean “in-
dependent conditioned on S”.
We choose an arbitrary d and prove by induction on k. The basis
k = 0 is trivial. Assume the claim holds for k, any G ∈ Bd and all
, δ > 0. We shall show that it holds for k + 1, any G ∈ Bd and any
δ,  > 0.
By the inductive hypothesis for every G ∈ Bd there exists a vertex
in G that has k (δ/100, )-good estimators (M1, . . . ,Mk).
Now, having k (δ/100, )-good estimators is a local property (Claim 3.6.27).
We now therefore apply Lemma 3.6.6: since every graph G ∈ Bd has a
vertex with k (δ/100, )-good estimators, any graph G ∈ Bd has a time
tk for which infinitely many distinct vertices {jr} have k (δ/100, )-good
estimators measurable at time tk.
In particular, if we fix an arbitrary i0 ∈ G then for every r there
exists a vertex j ∈ G that has k (δ/100, )-good estimators and whose
distance d(i0, j) from i0 is larger than r.
We shall prove the lemma by showing that for a vertex j that is far
enough from i0 which has (δ/100, )-good estimators (M1, . . . ,Mk), it
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holds that for a time tk+1 large enough (M1, . . . ,Mk, C
j
tk+1
) are (δ, )-
good estimators.
By Lemma 3.6.26 there exists an rδ such that if r > rδ and d(i0, j) >
2r thenW (Br(G, j)) is δ/100-independent ofA∞. Let r∗ = max{rδ, tk},
where tk is such that there are infinitely many vertices in G with k good
estimators measurable at time tk.
Let j be a vertex with k (δ/100, )-good estimators (M1, . . . ,Mk)
at time tk, such that d(i0, j) > 2r
∗. Denote
M¯ = (M1, . . . ,Mk).
Since d(i0, j) > 2rδ, W (Br∗(G, j)) is δ/100-independent of A∞, and
since Btk(G, j) ⊆ Br∗(G, j), W (Btk(G, j)) is δ/100-independent of A∞.
Finally, since M¯ ∈ σ(Hjtk), M¯ is a function of W (Btk(G, j)), and so by
Claim 3.6.11 we have that M¯ is also δ/100-independent of A∞.
For tk+1 large enough it holds that
• Kjtk+1 is equal to A∞ with probability at least 1− δ/100, since
lim
t→∞
P
[
Kjt = A∞
]
= 1,
by Claim 3.6.15.
• Additionally, P [Cjtk+1 = S] > p∗ − , since
lim
t→∞
P
[
Cjt = S
]
= p ≥ p∗,
by Claim 3.6.17.
We have then that (M¯, A∞) are δ/100-independent and P
[
Kjtk+1 6= A∞
] ≤
δ/100. Claim 3.6.10 states that if (A,B) are δ-independent P [B 6= C] ≤
δ′ then (A,C) are δ + 2δ′-independent. Applying this here we get that
(M¯,Kjtk+1) are δ/25-independent.
It follows by application of Claim 3.6.12 that (M1, . . . ,Mk, K
jtk+1)
are δ-independent. Since Cjtk+1 is a function of K
j
tk+1
and an inde-
pendent bit, it follows by another application of Claim 3.6.11 that
(M1, . . . ,Mk, C
j
tk+1
) are also δ-independent.
Finally, since P
[
Cjtk+1 = S
]
> p∗ − , j has the k + 1 (δ, )-good
estimators (M1, . . . , C
j
tk+1
) and the proof is concluded.

3.6.6.5. Asymptotic learning. As a tool in the analysis of finite
graphs, we would like to prove that in infinite graphs the agents learn
the correct state of the world almost surely.
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Theorem 3.6.29. Let G = (V,E) be an infinite, connected undi-
rected graph with bounded degrees (i.e., G is a general graph in B).
Then p(G) = 1.
Note that an alternative phrasing of this theorem is that p∗ = 1.
Proof. Assume the contrary, i.e. p∗ < 1. Let H be an infinite,
connected graph with bounded degrees such that p(H) = p∗, such as
we’ve shown exists in Lemma 3.6.25.
By Lemma 3.6.28 there exists for arbitrarily small , δ > 0 a vertex
w ∈ H that has access at some time T to three δ-independent estima-
tors (conditioned on S), each of which is equal to S with probability at
least p∗−. By Claims 3.6.13 and 3.6.20, the MAP estimator of S using
these estimators equals S with probability higher than p∗, for the ap-
propriate choice of low enough , δ. Therefore, since j’s action Ajt is the
MAP estimator of S, its probability of equaling S is P
[
Ajt = S
]
> p∗
as well, and so p(H) > p∗ - contradiction. 
Using Theorem 3.6.29 we prove Theorem 3.6.2, which is the corre-
sponding theorem for finite graphs:
Theorem (3.6.2). Let µ0, µ1 be such that for every connected, undi-
rected graph G there exists a random variable A∞ such that almost
surely Ai∞ = A∞ for all u ∈ V . Then there exists a sequence q(n) =
q(n, µ0, µ1) such that q(n)→ 1 as n→∞, and P [A∞ = S] ≥ q(n), for
any choice of undirected, connected graph G with n agents.
Proof. Assume the contrary. Then there exists a series of graphs
{Gr} with r agents such that limr→∞ P [A∞(Gr) = S] < 1, and so also
limr→∞ p(Gr) < 1.
By the same argument of Theorem 3.6.29 these graphs must all be
in Bd for some d, since otherwise, by Lemma 3.6.22, there would exist a
subsequence of graphs {Grd} with degree at least d and limd→∞ p(Grd) =
1. Since Bd is compact (Lemma 3.6.5), there exists a graph (G, i) ∈ Bd
that is the limit of a subsequence of {(Gr, ir)}∞r=1.
Since G is infinite and of bounded degree, it follows by Theo-
rem 3.6.29 that p(G) = 1, and in particular limr→∞ pi∞(r) = 1. As
before, pir(r) = p
i
∞(r), and therefore limr→∞ pir(r) = 1. Since p(Gr) ≥
pir(r), limr→∞ p(Gr) = 1, which is a contradiction. 
3.6.7. Convergence to identical optimal action sets. In this
section we prove Theorem 3.6.1.
Theorem (3.6.1). Let (µ0, µ1) induce non-atomic beliefs. Then
there exists a random variable A∞ such that almost surely Ai∞ = A∞
for all i.
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In this section we shall assume henceforth that the distribution of
initial private beliefs is non-atomic.
Given two agents i and j, let E0i denote the event that A
i
t equals
0 infinitely often E1j and the event that A
j
t equals 1 infinitely often.
Then a rephrasing of Theorem 3.1.1 is
Theorem 3.6.30. If agent i observes agent j’s actions then
P
[
E0i , E
1
j
]
= P
[
Bi∞ = 1/2, E
0
i , E
1
j
]
.
I.e., if agent i takes action 0 infinitely often, agent j takes action
1 infinitely, and i observes j then i’s belief is 1/2 at the limit, almost
surely.
Corollary 3.6.31. If agent i observes agent j’s actions, and j
takes both actions infinitely often then Bi∞ = 1/2.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that Bi∞ < 1/2. Then i takes
action 0 infinitely often. Therefore Theorem 3.6.30 implies that Bi∞ =
1/2 - contradiction.
The case where Bi∞ > 1/2 is treated similarly. 
3.6.7.1. Limit log-likelihood ratios. Denote
Y it = log
P
[
I it
∣∣∣S = 1, Ai[0,t)]
P
[
I it
∣∣∣S = 0, Ai[0,t)] .
In the next claim we show that Zit , the log-likelihood ratio inspired
by i’s observations up to time t, can be written as the sum of two
terms: Zi0 =
dµ1
dµ0
(Wi), which is the log-likelihood ratio inspired by i’s
private signal Wi, and Y
i
t , which depends only on the actions of i and
its neighbors, and does not depend directly on Wi.
Claim 3.6.32.
Zit = Z
i
0 + Y
i
t .
Proof. By definition we have that
Zit = log
P [S = 1|H it ]
P [S = 0|H it ]
= log
P [S = 1|I it ,Wi]
P [S = 0|I it ,Wi]
.
and by the law of conditional probabilities
Zit = log
P [I it |S = 1,Wi]P [Wi|S = 1]
P [I it |S = 0,Wi]P [Wi|S = 0]
= log
P [I it |S = 1,Wi]
P [I it |S = 0,Wi]
+ Zi0.
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Now I it , the actions of the neighbors of i up to time t, are a determin-
istic function of W (Bt(G, i)), the private signals in the ball of radius
t around i, by Claim 3.6.7. Conditioned on S these are all indepen-
dent, and so, from the definition of actions, these actions depend on i’s
private signal Wi only in as much as it affects the actions of i. Hence
P
[
I it
∣∣S = s,Wi] = P [I it ∣∣S = s, Ai[0,t)] ,
and therefore
Zit = log
P
[
I it
∣∣∣S = 1, Ai[0,t)]
P
[
I it
∣∣∣S = 0, Ai[0,t)] + Zi0
= Zi0 + Y
i
t .

Note that Y it is a deterministic function of I
i
t and A
i
[0,t).
Following our notation convention, we define Y i∞ = limt→∞ Y
i
t .
Note that this limit exists almost surely since the limit of Zit exists
almost surely. The following claim follows directly from the definitions:
Claim 3.6.33. Y i∞ is measurable in (A
i
[0,∞), Ii), the actions of i and
its neighbors.
3.6.7.2. Convergence of actions. The event that an agent takes both
actions infinitely often is (almost surely) a sufficient condition for con-
vergence to belief 1/2. This follows from the fact that these actions
imply that its belief takes values both above and below 1/2 infinitely
many times. We show that it is also (almost surely) a necessary con-
dition. Denote by Eai the event that i takes action a infinitely often.
Theorem 3.6.34.
P
[
E0i ∩ E1i , Bi∞ = 1/2
]
= P
[
Bi∞ = 1/2
]
.
I.e., it a.s. holds that Bi∞ = 1/2 iff i takes both actions infinitely
often.
Proof. We’ll prove the claim by showing that P [¬(E0i ∩ E1i ), Bi∞ = 1/2] =
0, or equivalently that P [¬(E0i ∩ E1i ), Zi∞ = 0] = 0 (recall that Zi∞ =
logBi∞/(1−Bi∞) and so Bi∞ = 1/2⇔ Zi∞ = 0).
Let a¯ = (a(1), a(2), . . .) be a sequence of actions, and denote by
W−i the private signals of all agents except i. Conditioning on W−i
and S we can write:
P
[
Ai[0,∞) = a¯, Z
i
∞ = 0
]
= E
[
P
[
Ai[0,∞) = a¯, Z
i
∞ = 0
∣∣W−i, S]]
= E
[
P
[
Ai[0,∞) = a¯, Z
i
0 = −Y i∞
∣∣W−i, S]]
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where the second equality follows from Claim 3.6.32. Note that by
Claim 3.6.33 Y i∞ is fully determined by A
i
[0,∞) and W−i. We can there-
fore write
P
[
Ai[0,∞) = a¯, Z
i
∞ = 0
]
= E
[
P
[
Ai[0,∞) = a¯, Z
i
0 = −Y i∞(W−i, a¯)
∣∣W−i, S]]
≤ E [P [Zi0 = −Y i∞(W−i, a¯)∣∣W−i, S]]
Now, conditioned on S, the private signalWi is distributed µS and is
independent of W−i. Hence its distribution when further conditioned
on W−i is still µS. Since Zi0 = log
dµ1
dµ0
(Wi), its distribution is also
unaffected, and in particular is still non-atomic. It therefore equals
−Y i∞(W−i, a¯) with probability zero, and so
P
[
Ai[0,∞) = a¯, Z
i
∞ = 0
]
= 0.
Since this holds for all sequences of actions a¯, it holds in particular for
all sequences which converge. Since there are only countably many such
sequences, the probability that the action converges (i.e., ¬(E0i ∩E1i ))
and Zi∞ = 0 is zero, or
P
[¬(E0i ∩ E1i ), Zi∞ = 0] = 0.

Hence it impossible for an agent’s belief to converge to 1/2 and for
the agent to only take one action infinitely often. A direct consequence
of this, together with Thm. 3.6.30, is the following corollary:
Corollary 3.6.35. The union of the following three events occurs
with probability one:
(1) ∀u ∈ V : limt→∞Ait = S. Equivalently, all agents converge to
the correct action.
(2) ∀u ∈ V : limt→∞Ait = 1−S. Equivalently, all agents converge
to the wrong action.
(3) ∀u ∈ V : Bi∞ = 1/2, and in this case all agents take both
actions infinitely often and hence don’t converge at all.
Proof. Consider first the case that there exists a vertex i such
that i takes both actions infinitely often. Let j be a vertex that ob-
serves i. Then by Corollary 3.6.31 we have that Bj∞ = 1/2, and by
Theorem 3.6.34 j also takes both actions infinitely often. Continuing
by induction and using the fact that the graph is strongly connected we
obtain the third case that none of the agents converge and Bi∞ = 1/2
for all i.
It remains to consider the case that all agents’ actions converge
to either 0 or 1. Using strong connectivity, to prove the theorem it
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suffices to show that it cannot be the case that j observes i and they
converge to different actions. In this case, by Corollary 3.6.31 we have
that Bj∞ = 1/2, and then by Theorem 3.6.34 agent j’s actions do not
converge - contradiction. 
Theorem 3.6.1 is an easy consequence of this theorem.
Theorem (3.6.1). Let (µ0, µ1) induce non-atomic beliefs. Then
there exists a random variable A∞ such that almost surely Ai∞ = A∞
for all i.
Proof. Fix an agent j. When Bj∞ < 1/2 (resp. B
j
∞ > 1/2) then
the first (resp. second) case of corollary 3.6.35 occurs and A∞ = 0
(resp. A∞ = 1). Likewise when Bj∞ = 1/2 then the third case occurs,
Bi∞ = 1/2 for all i ∈ V and Ai∞ = {0, 1} for all i ∈ V . 
3.6.8. Extension to L-locally connected graphs. The main
result of this article, Theorem 3.6.2, is a statement about undirected
graphs. We can extend the proof to a larger family of graphs, namely,
L-locally connected graphs.
Let G = (V,E) be a directed graph. G is L-locally strongly con-
nected if, for each (i, j) ∈ E, there exists a path in G of length at most
L from j to i.
Theorem 3.6.2 can be extended as follows.
Theorem 3.6.36. Fix L, a positive integer. Let µ0, µ1 be such
that for every strongly connected, directed graph G there exists a ran-
dom variable A∞ such that almost surely Ai∞ = A∞ for all u ∈ V .
Then there exists a sequence q(n) = q(n, µ0, µ1) such that q(n)→ 1 as
n → ∞, and P [A∞ = S] ≥ q(n), for any choice of L-locally strongly
connected graph G with n agents.
The proof of Theorem 3.6.36 is essentially identical to the proof of
Theorem 3.6.2. The latter is a consequence of Theorem 3.6.29, which
shows learning in bounded degree infinite graphs, and of Lemma 3.6.22,
which implies asymptotic learning for sequences of graphs with diverg-
ing maximal degree.
Note first that the set of L-locally strongly connected rooted graphs
with degrees bounded by d is compact. Hence the proof of Theo-
rem 3.6.29 can be used as is in the L-locally strongly connected setup.
In order to apply Lemma 3.6.22 in this setup, we need to show that
when in-degrees diverge then so do out-degrees. For this note that if
(i, j) is a directed edge then i is in the (directed) ball of radius L around
j. Hence, if there exists a vertex j with in-degree D then in the ball
of radius L around it there are at least D vertices. On the other hand,
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if the out-degree is bounded by d, then the number of vertices in this
ball is at most L · dL. Therefore, d→∞ as D →∞.
3.6.9. Example of Non-atomic private beliefs leading to
non-learning. We sketch an example in which private beliefs are atomic
and asymptotic learning does not occur.
Example 3.6.37. Let the graph G be the undirected chain of length
n, so that V = {1, . . . , n} and (i, j) is an edge if |i − j| = 1. Let
the private signals be bits that are each independently equal to S with
probability 2/3. We choose here the tie breaking rule under which agents
defer to their original signals1.
We leave the following claim as an exercise to the reader.
Claim 3.6.38. If an agent i has at least one neighbor with the same
private signal (i.e., Wi = Wj for j a neighbor of i) then i will always
take the same action Ait = Wi.
Since this happens with probability that is independent of n, with
probability bounded away from zero an agent will always take the
wrong action, and so asymptotic learning does not occur. It is also
clear that optimal action sets do not become common knowledge, and
these fact are indeed related.
1We conjecture that changing the tie-breaking rule does not produce asymptotic
learning, even for randomized tie-breaking.
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